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This study includes three essays that seek to better understand the relationship between 
intercollegiate athletics activities and higher education institutions.  The first essay is a review of 
the literature, which provides evidence of a strong relationship, specifically a financial 
relationship, between athletics and higher education.  The next two essays conduct empirical 
studies to test aspects of this relationship.  In Essay 2, panel regressions and an instrumental 
variables approach are used with data from the USA Today athletics finance database to analyze 
the effects of winning on institutional subsidies to athletics.  Basketball wins are found to have a 
positive effect on the amount of subsidy that an institution provides to intercollegiate athletics.  
However, no evidence of a similar effect of football wins is found.  A possible explanation for 
this difference is the timing of the respective season in the typical university budget cycle.  Essay 
3 uses a regression discontinuity approach with data from the Department of Education’s Equity 
in Athletics database to test the effects of making the men’s NCAA basketball tournament on 
athletic and institutional revenues.  The findings suggest that making the tournament increases 
basketball-specific and total athletics revenues, but has no effect on institutional revenues.  
Although athletics success has been found to be associated with positive outcomes in other 
literature (e.g., higher applications), these essays provide evidence that any revenue increases 
related to success are isolated to the athletic department and are not realized by the institution.  In 
fact, institutions appear to respond to athletics success by increasing the subsidies that they 
provide to athletics.  Taken together, these essays provide insight into the relationship between 
athletics activities and the higher education institutions that choose to sponsor these activities. 
 Keywords: intercollegiate athletics finance, subsidies, regression discontinuity, 
instrumental variables 
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ATHLETICS AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE LITERATURE 
There is a substantial amount of research on athletics in higher education.  Specific 
research topics range from the academic effects of athletic participation on student-athletes to the 
financial effects of winning teams on donor contributions to an institution.  The challenge lies in 
synthesizing these disparate lines of research to provide a comprehensive understanding of 
intercollegiate athletics’ current role in higher education.  The purpose of this literature review is 
to address this challenge by exploring what the current literature finds about the relationship 
between intercollegiate athletics activities and higher education.  To be sure, there are gaps in the 
current literature that further complicate the understanding of this relationship; and some of these 
gaps will be discussed in this literature review.  The review includes a historical perspective of 
athletics in higher education and a review of the pertinent contemporary literature that examines 
the effects of athletics on institutions, student-athletes, and other stakeholders.   
Historical Perspective 
A basic background on the origins of athletics in higher education may provide some 
useful context in understanding their current state.  The origins of athletics in higher education 
could be traced back to intramural activities in early colleges and universities, but organized 
intercollegiate athletics became popular in the late nineteenth century.  College football was 
already well established by the start of the twentieth century.  The first intercollegiate football 
game was played in 1869 between Princeton and Rutgers.  However, this game resembled soccer 
more than modern football, so historians commonly point to the 1875 game between Harvard 
and Yale as the first college game with rules resembling modern football (Westby & Sack, 
1976).   
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Savage, Bentley, McGovern, & Smiley (1929) argue that the development of college 
sports was a result of the transformation of higher education in general during the late nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century.  They note that American institutions during this time were 
aspiring to become universities, shifting their focus away from undergraduate teaching to 
graduate programs and research.  Although Savage et al. (1929) do not reference Eliot’s elective 
system at Harvard, where the prescribed classical curriculum was replaced with a broadly 
elective course of study (Rudolph, 1962), they suggest that the increased opportunities for 
students to pursue programs of study based on market factors had an impact on the development 
of athletics.  Furthermore, higher education was growing rapidly during the early twentieth 
century; enrollments grew 400% during the first three decades of the twentieth century (Levine, 
1986, p. 68).  In addition to the significant growth, higher education was also broadening its 
scope.  The research function was becoming a primary mission of higher education (Geiger, 
1986).  While higher education was experiencing this dynamic growth and change, college 
athletics also began to flourish. 
There were undoubtedly a number of individuals who influenced the direction of 
intercollegiate athletics during its infancy and helped shape its place within higher education.  
Westby and Sack (1976) claim that Yale and its popular football coach, Walter Camp, played a 
key role in the evolution of athletics.  Under Camp, Yale’s football program became the first to 
centralize decision-making responsibility to a single person – the head coach; introduce 
specialization, especially for coaches; and adopt continuous performance analysis methods 
(Westby & Sack, 1976).  These were important innovations.  In the late nineteenth century, 
coaching was far from specialized, with faculty, graduates, or even undergraduates filling the 
role (Savage et al., 1929, p. 21).  Yale was considered the preeminent athletic program in the 
  3 
 
early twentieth century.  “It was the best-known and most popular embodiment of college life 
because ‘Yale’s Democracy’ was depicted by journalists as a distinctive education philosophy, a 
‘dynamo’ of undergraduate activity that emphasized the harnessing of individual ambition to 
group accomplishment” (Thelin, 1994, p. 17). 
 Yale’s Camp was also instrumental in the development and formalization of the rules of 
the game of football.  Yale and Camp’s innovations were not enthusiastically received at all 
institutions.  Some, like Charles Eliot at Harvard, thought athletics should be pursued for fun and 
recreation, not mass entertainment and commercial benefits.  However, “by the early twentieth 
century, most schools and universities, including Harvard, had abandoned attempts to preserve 
amateur sport” (Westby & Sack, 1976, p. 645).  The mixed opinions on the appropriate role of 
athletics led to strong debate in the late nineteenth century.  While most, even Eliot at Harvard, 
recognized the benefits of athletics, there were frequent objections to a perceived over-
extravagance in college sports.  Even the more ardent supporters of athletics, like Camp at Yale, 
supported moderation in some areas, including press reporting (Savage et al., 1929, pp. 24-25). 
 Football revenues at Harvard and Yale show the significant growth that the sport 
experienced in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century.  Yale’s football receipts, 
excluding dues and donations, increased from $860 in 1875-76 to $72,961 in 1909-10, 
representing a 13% annual increase (Westby & Sacks, 1976, p. 630).  In constant 2013 dollars, 
the increase was from $18,668 to almost $1.8 million.
1
  Similarly, Harvard’s receipts increased 
from $706 to $78,584 over the same time period, representing a 14% annual increase (Westby & 
Sacks, 1976, p. 630).  Again in constant 2013 dollars, this increase was from approximately 
                                                          
1
 This time period predates the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Price Index (CPI), so these conversions also 
rely on the Historical Statistics of the United States (Carter et al., 2006), in addition to CPI data from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. 
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$15,325 to over $1.9 million.  Both of these growth figures greatly outpaced ordinary inflation 
during the time period. 
 Intercollegiate athletics continued to grow in the 1920’s, and one of the important 
developments during this decade was the nationalization of football.  Regional football rivalries 
began to develop as teams traveled considerable distances to compete against each other.  
Specifically, football teams from the Midwest, West, and South fulfilled their desire to challenge 
the powerful teams from the East (Oriard, 2001, p. 65). 
 Thelin (1994) states that college sports during the 1920’s resembled industrial operations 
in some respects – like the standardized procedures that Camp enlisted at Yale – but he suggests 
that a medieval metaphor might be more appropriate.  Athletic departments and coaches were 
“dukes and barons whose territories were only loosely controlled by university boards and 
presidents” (Thelin, 1994, p. 21).  Savage et al. (1929) also describe the apparent disconnect 
between athletics and the more traditional roles of higher education institutions: 
Their financial and public aspects, the reputation which they confer upon the institution, 
and a thousand other forces have united to make them not so much activities of 
undergraduate life as joint cooperative enterprises involving presidents, trustees, 
faculties, alumni, and townsmen, and the vast publics of the radio and the press; they are 
undertaken less for the diversion of the schoolboy or the undergraduate than for the 
amusement of others. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 79) 
 The issues that arose out of college athletics’ growth and change during the early 
twentieth century ultimately came to a head in a report by the Carnegie Foundation in 1929, 
titled American College Athletics.  College athletics was taken on as a research topic sort of 
reluctantly by the Carnegie Foundation.  Pilot studies had been conducted for several years, but 
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deferred.  Walter Camp’s death in 1925 may have finally opened the door for reform efforts 
(Thelin, 1994, p. 22).  The investigation was led by Howard Savage, with him and his team 
conducting more than 100 site visits to assess the state of intercollegiate athletics across the 
nation.  While the detailed report included findings in many specific areas, one of the main 
arguments was that commercialization was pervasive in college sports, which directly 
contradicted the coveted ideal of amateurism.  In other words, college sports were increasingly 
being pursued for their commercial/financial benefits rather than for the enjoyment and personal 
satisfaction of the amateur student-athlete. 
 American College Athletics, also referred to as the Carnegie Report, was not the first call 
for reform in college sports, the AAUP had also called for athletics reform in the early twentieth 
century, but it did change the focus of the debate slightly.  In the early twentieth century, reform 
discussions focused on physical aspects of athletics.  One of the most important examples is 
President Theodore Roosevelt’s demand for reducing the number of injuries and deaths in 
college football that ultimately led to the creation of the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(Thelin, 1994, p. 15).  American College Athletics brought other issues to the forefront, including 
subsidies being paid to student-athletes and recruiting improprieties.  While it wasn’t completely 
novel, it became very popular – and controversial – and its findings became headlines in some of 
the country’s leading newspapers (Thelin, 1994, p. 13).   
 One piece of evidence that Savage et al. (1929) used to point out the growing 
commercialization during the 1920’s was the construction of new facilities.  Many institutions 
built massive football stadiums during the early twentieth century.  The costs were far from 
insignificant, with some approaching $2 million ($2 million in 1922 was the equivalent of almost 
$28 million in 2013) in the early 1920’s (Savage et al., 1929, p. 92).  Stadium building efforts 
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highlighted the growing importance of boosterism in college athletics during this era, as boosters 
were often called upon to fund the expensive projects.  “Football appealed most strongly to the 
civic and business boosters, who embraced the local team as a symbol of the city’s energy and 
achievement” (Oriard, 2001, pp. 69-70).  Institutions also invested in other sports venues as well.  
Armories during this time often served as shared facilities for military and athletic purposes.  
However, at some institutions, including Illinois, military instructors often objected to sharing 
the facilities and effectively monopolized the armories (Savage et al., 1929, p. 93).   
 American College Athletics also discussed the recruitment and subsidization of student-
athletes during the 1920’s.  The Carnegie Report used the term subsidy to describe any form of 
payment to athletes.  Today, the term is used to describe institutional contributions to athletic 
departments; in fact, Essay 2 focuses on these institutional subsidies.  Nevertheless, the issues of 
recruitment and subsidization of student-athletes were identified as major problems that posed 
risks to student-athletes and threatened the amateur ideal in the Carnegie Report:  
The recruiting of American college athletes, be it active or passive, professional or non-
professional, has reached the proportions of nationwide commerce.  In spite of the efforts 
of not a few teachers and principals who have comprehended its dangers, its effect upon 
the character of the schoolboy has been profoundly deleterious.  Its influence upon the 
nature of American higher education has been no less noxious.  The element that 
demoralizes is the subsidy, the monetary or material advantage that is used to attract the 
schoolboy athlete.  It is seldom lacking in the general process of gathering ‘a winning 
team.’ (Savage et al., 1929, p. 240) 
It should be noted that providing subsidies to student-athletes was prohibited during the early 
twentieth century in accordance with the ideal of complete amateurism.  It was not until 1946 
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that the “Sanity Code” was enacted, which allowed institutions to offer need-based financial aid 
to student-athletes.  Due to difficulties enforcing the “Sanity Code,” it was quickly abolished, 
allowing institutions to provide financial aid based solely on athletic ability (Lapchick & 
Slaughter, 1989, p. 9-10).  Savage et al. (1929) referred to the subsidization of athletes as the 
“deepest shadow that darkens American college and school athletics” (p. 265).  However, there 
were bright spots in the Carnegie Report related to subsidies.  Their investigation found no 
evidence of subsidizing athletes at 28 of the 112 colleges and universities, disproving the belief 
that competitive athletics was impossible without subsidization (Savage et al., 1929, pp. 241-
242).  
 The Carnegie Report was also critical of the media’s contribution to the development and 
commercialization of college athletics in the early twentieth century.  In 1929, one in four 
readers bought the newspaper primarily for the sports section (Oriard, 2001, p. 25).  However, 
the Carnegie Report was careful not to blame the increased number of sports pages and general 
coverage as the problem.  Newspapers were, after all, only responding to an increased public 
interest in college sporting events.  However, the Carnegie Report was critical of the 
“sensationalism” of sportswriters that had the effect of exploiting persons and personalities.  This 
sensationalism was in direct conflict with the amateur ideal (Savage et al., 1929).   
 Not all of the findings of the Carnegie Report were negative or necessarily troublesome.  
Financial accountability received a clean bill of health in the report.  In general, Savage et al. 
(1929) did not find major problems with the financial bookkeeping of athletic departments, 
although Thelin (1994) points out that their analysis likely omitted external finances that were 
outside the institutions’ control.  Nevertheless, athletic accounts were usually well kept and 
audited by a reputable external accounting firm (Savage et al., 1929, p. 86).  
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 American College Athletics was highly critical of several aspects of intercollegiate 
athletics, two of which were the commercialization of sports and the lack of control by university 
presidents.  Fast forward 70 years and the results of the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate 
Athletics reports were essentially the same.  The Knight Commission was initiated in 1989 by 
the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation to look at, much like the Carnegie Report, the 
connections between higher education and intercollegiate athletics and to propose a reform 
agenda.  The trustees of the Knight Foundation “were concerned that athletics abuses threatened 
the very integrity of higher education” (Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, 1993, p. 
2).  The outcome of the Commission was the proposal of a “one-plus-three” model for reforms 
that called for increased presidential control and identified academic integrity, financial integrity, 
and certification as the three main impact areas (Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, 
1993).  While the Knight Commission has issued subsequent reports, it is not clear whether any 
reforms have been successfully implemented. 
Women in College Sports 
The evolution of women’s college sports is another interesting aspect of intercollegiate 
athletics history.  Women’s college sports began to grow in popularity in the late 1960’s.  In 
1967, the Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (CIAW) was formed to promote 
women’s athletic participation and to organize national championships.  The CIAW was replaced 
by the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW) in 1971 (Adams &  Soladay, 
1972).  By this time, of course, the NCAA was well established and had expressed little interest 
in women’s sports.  The NCAA, in fact, amended and clarified its bylaws in 1964 to limit 
participation to males only (Wushanley, 2004).   
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The AIAW’s model was quite different from the NCAA’s from the outset.  Whereas the 
NCAA was highly commercialized, the AIAW expressed a commitment to the educational 
objectives of its member institutions.  In its first handbook of policies and procedures, the AIAW 
invited members “if they subscribe to the belief that the focus of women’s intercollegiate 
athletics should remain on the individual participation in her primary role as a college student” 
(Adams & Soladay, 1972, p. 6).  One of the key differences between the NCAA and the AIAW 
in the early years was that the AIAW prohibited scholarships based on athletic ability.  This 
policy was consistent with their “educational model.”  However, the AIAW reversed this policy 
when threatened by the Kellmeyer, et al. v. NEA, et al. lawsuit (Wushanley, 2004).   
The AIAW grew rapidly from 280 two- and four-year colleges and universities in 1971-
72 to 970 active member institutions in 1979-80 (AIAW, 1980).  Women’s college athletics 
began to receive increased attention as a result of the priority placed on the United States’ 
performance at the Olympics during the Cold War (Wushanley, 2004).  In order for the United 
States to compete for the most number of medals, they needed to perform well in the women’s 
events.   
As women’s college sports began growing in popularity and the AIAW began 
experiencing some success, the NCAA took notice.  Also contributing to the NCAA’s interest in 
women’s intercollegiate athletics was the Title IX legislation of 1972.  Title IX was part of the 
Educational Amendments of 1972 to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The statute states that, “No 
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance” (Title IX Educational Amendments, 1972).  The legislation did not 
specifically mention intercollegiate athletics, and there was some debate at the time as to whether 
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it even applied to college sports (Kuhn, 1976).  Part of the debate centered on the stipulation in 
the law about the receipt of federal financial assistance.  Since athletic departments did not 
receive federal assistance directly, some argue for a “program-specific” interpretation of the 
language which would exclude athletic departments.  In fact, this interpretation was supported by 
the Grove City College v. Bell (1984) court decision.  However, others believed in an 
“institution-specific” interpretation, which would mean that athletic departments were subject to 
Title IX so long as their host institutions accepted federal financial assistance of any kind, 
including student financial aid.  This interpretation was codified in law as part of the Civil Rights 
Restoration Act of 1987 and remains the law of the land today (Civil Rights Restoration Act, 
1987).  As the details of who was subject to Title IX were being worked out over several years, it 
is not surprising that the implementation was slow and clumsy.  The Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW) was assigned enforcement responsibilities for Title IX.  HEW 
originally gave a grace period for compliance, which was eventually extended, minimizing the 
immediate effects felt by athletic departments (Heckman, 1992).     
While Title IX had little immediate impact due to confusion over its implementation, it 
did force the NCAA to consider how it would comply.  When the AIAW resisted overtures to 
incorporate into the NCAA, the NCAA took matters into its own hands.  In 1975, the NCAA 
announced that it would be offering women’s championships.  To attract institutions to its 
championships, the NCAA offered economic incentives for women’s programs to join: free 
membership and free participation in championship events.  AIAW programs had to pay dues 
and pay their own way at championships.  They then tied their men’s Final Four television 
contract to the women’s basketball championship game, making it a more attractive option than 
the AIAW championship game (Sperber, 1990).  The AIAW could not compete and soon 
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dissolved.  Some would describe the NCAA’s actions as predatory toward the AIAW (Sperber, 
1990), while others may contribute the AIAW’s demise to its own policies that ultimately limited 
its financial resources (Wushanley, 2004).   
Women’s college sports have continued to grow in popularity since the 1980s.  At the 
same time, Title IX’s application has been clarified through a series of court decisions.  In 
chronicling the major decisions, Heckman (2003) points out that the court has relied on the 1979 
Policy Interpretation in deciding cases related to Title IX.  The Policy Interpretation outlined 
three tests for compliance.  It stated that institutions will be assessed based on proportionality of 
students and student-athletes of the same sex, displaying a history and continuing practice of 
program expansion, and fully accommodating the interests and abilities of the underrepresented 
gender (Office of Civil Rights, 1979).  While Heckman (2003) acknowledges gains in 
opportunities for female student-athletes under Title IX, she concludes that “the ‘glass sneaker’ 
continues to exist for females in athletics and its continued vulnerability has become glaringly 
evident since entering the new millennium” (p. 615).  Perhaps one of the main takeaways from 
the evolution of women’s college sports is the dominant role that the NCAA has taken in 
intercollegiate athletics.  
As intercollegiate athletics have evolved, the NCAA has solidified its role as the primary 
governing body for college sports.  It has grown into what some call an empire (Sperber, 1990), 
with over 1,000 member or affiliated institutions.  Football and basketball, both men’s and 
women’s, are considered the revenue generating sports.  Because of their financial importance, 
these sports are the focus of much of the literature.  However, nonrevenue sports are also an 
essential part of intercollegiate athletics.  The NCAA mandates that institutions sponsor these 
sports in order to field revenue generating football and basketball teams.  For example, the 
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NCAA requires programs to field 16 varsity sports in order to be eligible to participate in their 
highest division, Division I, which is sometimes referred to as big-time college sports (NCAA, 
2007).  This requirement effectively represents a minimum level of investment in athletics for 
institutions wishing to participate in Division I.  One could argue that these mandated 
investments come at the expense of investments in other institutional priorities. 
This brief history shows that athletics have a long tradition in higher education, but also 
that the relationship between athletics and higher education has been troubled at times.  As early 
as the Carnegie Report of 1929, observers had recognized a tension between the traditional 
values and missions of higher education institutions and their approach to intercollegiate 
athletics.  Essentially the same issues addressed in the Carnegie Report were identified by the 
Knight Commission reports on intercollegiate athletic reform in recent decades.  This suggests 
that athletics have effectively resisted reform while growing in scale and visibility.   
Effects of Athletics on Institutions 
 It seems intuitive to expect intercollegiate athletics to impact the institutions that host 
them.  The following sections explore the financial and non-financial effects of athletics on 
institutions.  The financial effects section specifically looks at athletic subsidies, indirect 
financial effects, and the tax status of intercollegiate athletics.  The non-financial effects section 
looks at the “advertising effect” as it relates to athletics’ impacts on enrollments, and also 
includes a discussion of critics of intercollegiate athletics. 
Financial Effects 
 Discussion of the financial effects of athletics on institutions may be aided by a basic 
overview of the major revenue and expenditure streams for athletic departments and some 
descriptive statistics of the various elements.  Fulks (2012) highlights the disparities that exist in 
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intercollegiate athletics finance, even across the Division I subdivisions.  The median generated 
revenue for NCAA Division I athletic programs that participate in the Football Bowl Subdivision 
(FBS) was $38.8 million in 2011 and median total expenses were $50.8 million (Fulks, 2012).  
For Division I programs participating in the Football Championship Subdivision (FCS), the 
median generated revenue was $3.4 million in 2011, compared to median total expenses of $13.2 
million (Fulks, 2012).  For Division I programs that do not participate in football, the median 
generated revenue was $2.2 million in 2011 compared to median total expenses of $11.9 million 
(Fulks, 2012).  The gap between generated revenues and expenses is often filled with what the 
NCAA refers to as “allocated revenues,” which are comprised of student fees, direct institutional 
aid, indirect institutional support, and direct governmental support (Fulks, 2012).  These revenue 
streams may also be referred to as “athletic subsidies,” and will be discussed in detail in the next 
section. 
Athletic subsidies.  The brief history of intercollegiate athletics provided earlier showed 
that athletics have been a fixture in higher education for some time.  There is a financial 
component to this relationship that has begun to receive increased attention and scrutiny in recent 
years.  Perhaps the biggest myth of college sports is that they generate large profits that directly 
benefit the host colleges and universities financially.  The truth is that the flow of financial 
support typically moves from the university to the athletic department (Kahn, 2007), instead of 
the other way around.  There are several ways in which institutions support athletic programs 
financially, ranging from direct budget transfers to covering the deficits generated by athletic 
departments.  This support highlights the strong financial relationship between the two. 
 In big-time college sports, ticket sales and media contracts for football and men’s 
basketball are the primary revenue generators.  However, athletic department financial reports 
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provided to the NCAA also include revenue line items for student fees, direct institutional 
support, and indirect facilities and administrative support (Fulks, 2012).  Direct institutional 
support and indirect facilities and administrative support are clearly resources that flow from the 
university to the athletic departments.  Student fees are also going to the athletic department 
instead of the institution to support student programs or academic initiatives.   
 The existence of deficits in intercollegiate athletics also defies the myth that they are 
profit machines.  Deficits, even at large, Division I programs are not uncommon.  While football 
programs often generate profits, nonrevenue sports and administrative expenses can burn through 
these profits, leaving the athletic department with an aggregate deficit.  In 2003, three Big Ten 
institutions – Indiana University, Purdue University, and University of Minnesota – reported 
total expenses that exceeded total revenues (Indianapolis Star, 2005).  The average deficit for 
these three programs was -$535 thousand, while the average profit from their football programs 
was over $7 million.  In other words, the significant profits from the football programs were not 
sufficient to cover the entire athletic enterprise at these institutions.  Athletic department deficits 
again point to a strong financial relationship since the institutions will effectively be covering the 
deficits amassed by athletics. 
 Kahn (2007) looked at aggregate revenue and expense data for athletic programs.  He 
found that Division I-A schools, which would be referred to as FBS schools today, reported an 
average profit of $2.2 million; Division I-AA, known now as FCS, schools reported an average 
deficit of -$300 thousand; and Division I-AAA schools also reported an average deficit of -$300 
thousand (Kahn, 2007, p. 220).  These figures, however, include institutional sources of revenue 
and do not represent true self-sufficient profit or loss figures.  When institutional sources are 
excluded, all three divisions showed average deficits.  Without institutional support, Division I-A 
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produced a deficit of -$600 thousand; Division I-AA produced a deficit of -$3.7 million; and 
Division I-AAA produced a deficit of -$3.5 million (Kahn, 2007, p. 220).  This phenomenon 
runs directly counter to the myth that intercollegiate athletic programs generate profits for their 
host institutions, and is likely what motivated James Duderstadt, former University of Michigan 
President, to quip that nearly all athletic departments are net financial losers, even though they 
tout their self-sufficiency (Duderstadt, 2000).  In fact, it appears that athletic departments are far 
from self-sufficient and rely heavily on their strong financial ties to the institutions. 
 A more recent study by Denhart and Vedder (2010) considerd athletic subsidies in detail.  
They show the prevalence of subsidies in general, but also examine differences across 
institutions.  Denhart and Vedder consider subsidies a tax on institutional revenues and their 
study tests the hypothesis that the tax is regressive, disproportionately affecting institutions and 
students that can least afford to pay.  Their findings suggest that certain institutional 
characteristics are associated with higher levels of subsidies.  Specifically, they found that lower 
enrollments, lower institutional wealth, and higher percentages of Pell-eligible students were 
associated with higher athletic subsidies (Denhart & Vedder, 2010, p. 14).  Denhart and Vedder 
conclude that these findings support their assertion that athletic subsidies represent a regressive 
tax on institutions and students.  One critique of this study is that it only uses data from FBS 
institutions, raising questions about the generalizability of these findings to other NCAA 
divisions.  Another critique is that Denhart and Vedder’s study is purely descriptive in nature, 
simply highlighting differences in subsidies across institutions without looking for a causal 
relationship.  They make no attempt to explain why these differences exist or understand the 
decisions that lead to these differences.   
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While athletic subsidies suggest that an overall economic benefit does not exist, some 
studies refute this claim (e.g., Goff, 2000).  Goff (2000) questions the legitimacy of the claim 
that athletics do not provide a direct financial benefit to institutions.  He claims that three 
adjustments need to be made to the finance data when comparing revenues and expenses.  
Specifically, Goff lists the valuation of grants-in-aid at list price rather than incremental expense, 
attributing athletic revenues to non-athletic accounts, and attributing athletic expenses to non-
athletic accounts as three issues with the finance data that can lead to an inaccurate assessment of 
athletics’ true financial contribution.  He suggests that athletics are net financial contributors to 
institutions when adjustments for these three issues are made.  Goff offers very little empirical 
evidence to support his assertion, but he references a 1992 study of Western Kentucky 
University’s athletic financial statement (Borland, Goff, & Pulsinelli, 1992).  Borland et al. 
(1992) found that, after making the types of accounting adjustments outlined by Goff, the 
athletics operating loss at Western Kentucky improved from -$1.2 million to -$330 thousand.  
However, this study considered institutional subsidies as athletic revenues.  Even if athletic 
departments are more profitable after making certain accounting adjustments, the very existence 
of institutional subsidies undermines Goff’s assertion that athletics are a net financial contributor 
to institutions of higher education.   
A strong financial connection exists between intercollegiate athletics and higher 
education.  This relationship generally includes a flow of financial support from higher education 
institutions to athletic departments, which contradicts the perception that athletic departments are 
self-sufficient.  This financial dependency is not, however, necessarily a problem.  Certainly, the 
existence of deficits in any area of higher education is not ideal, but their existence does not 
necessarily indicate out of control finances.  In the same way, institutional support for athletics, 
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while defying the myth that athletics are self-supporting, does not necessarily indicate misplaced 
priorities.  These types of judgments require a closer look at the context of intercollegiate 
athletics in higher education and the utility of their many outcomes, including nonfinancial 
outcomes.  Nonfinancial outcomes may represent benefits to the institution or to student-athletes 
that justify the subsidies to athletics.   
Indirect financial impacts.  Goff (2000) highlights the indirect economic benefits to 
institutions that may result from their athletic programs.  Positive effects on donations and state 
appropriations are two of the indirect economic benefits addressed in the literature.   
Baade and Sundberg (1996) found that, although winning percentage did not have a 
statistically significant relationship with alumni giving, bowl game appearances were positively 
associated with donations to public and private institutions.  Postseason basketball tournament 
appearances were also positively associated with donations, but only to public institutions.  
These results suggest that donors are more strongly compelled to contribute by postseason 
success than regular season success.  A postseason appearance “legitimizes a good record, while 
a good record without a postseason appearance is very disappointing” (Goff, 2000, p. 800). 
Other research has attempted to pinpoint exactly what kinds of donations are affected by 
athletic success.  Sigelman and Bookheimer (1983) also found football success to be associated 
with higher alumni contributions, but only those contributions directed to an institution’s athletic 
department.  These contributions are restricted and intended only for the support of athletics 
programs, as opposed to annual fund contributions that can be used for any purpose.  The 
correlation between football success and donations to the institution’s annual fund was actually 
negative, but not statistically significant.  This may suggest that football success encourages 
alumni to direct their gifts to the athletic department rather than the annual fund.  Restricted gifts 
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could be considered less beneficial to a higher education institution than general, unrestricted 
donations to the annual fund that can be used for any purpose.   
Humphreys and Mondello (2007) further validated the claim that athletic success is 
related to restricted gifts, rather than unrestricted gifts.  They found that for public institutions, 
appearances in bowl games and the postseason men’s basketball tournament had positive and 
statistically significant relationship with restricted donations, but no significant relationship with 
unrestricted donations.  Bowl game appearances were associated with a 12% increase in 
restricted donations and postseason basketball appearances were associated with an 8.5% 
increase.  For private institutions, only appearances in the postseason men’s basketball 
tournament had a significant relationship with restricted donations; they were associated with a 
9.8% increase in restricted donations.  “Because restricted donations include funds earmarked for 
the athletic department, our [these] results indicate that the academic units at institutions might 
not benefit from athletics-related increases in donations” (Humphreys & Mondello, 2007, p. 
278).  Despite the restricted nature of these contributions, they are financial resources flowing 
into the institution and represent at least a nominal economic benefit. 
Grimes and Chressanthis (1994) provide somewhat different evidence regarding the 
nature of donations.  Their single-institution study at Mississippi State University (MSU) also 
looked at the relationship between athletics and donations, but they were able to distinguish 
academic contributions from athletic contributions.  Ignoring contributions earmarked for 
athletics, Grimes and Chressanthis found that winning percentage in MSU’s three revenue-
producing sports of football, men’s basketball, and baseball had a positive and statistically 
significant relationship with academic contributions.  Television appearances in baseball also had 
a significant relationship with contributions.  Postseason appearances was not associated with 
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academic contributions.  “The empirical results suggest that the athletic success of a school’s 
overall sports program can positively influence the level of alumni giving to the academic side of 
the institution.  Thus, intercollegiate athletics is found to generate a spillover benefit to the 
university” (Grimes & Chressanthis, 1994, p. 38).  It is also interesting to note that Grimes and 
Chressanthis identified a negative relationship between NCAA sanctions and academic 
contributions to MSU. 
There may be additional indirect economic benefits to athletics.  Humphreys (2006) 
found that participation in college football corresponded to an increase in state appropriations of 
8%.  Although this relationship was statistically significant, football success, measured by bowl 
game appearance and final rankings, did not have a statistically significant relationship with state 
appropriations.  Humphreys (2006) applied Becker’s (1983) model of competition for political 
influence among pressure groups to posit that the positive relationship between big-time college 
football participation and state appropriations may result from the influence of alumni, fans, and 
athletic booster groups.  Humphreys’s study is especially interesting because it identifies a 
benefit to institutions for simply participating in athletics, whereas most other studies look at the 
effects of athletics success. 
Tax status.  The tax status of intercollegiate athletics offers another connection between 
higher education institutions and their athletic departments.  This status has periodically received 
attention in the media and Congress.  The most recent inquiry into the tax exemption for 
intercollegiate athletics came in 2006 when the chairman of the House Ways and Means 
Committee requested that the NCAA respond to a list of questions (“Congress’ letter,” 2006).  
The NCAA was essentially asked to justify their tax exempt status.  No changes were made to 
the exemption as a result of the inquiry.   
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Tax experts have examined the intricacies of this exemption and have discussed its 
origins and merits.  Colombo (2010) outlines the pertinent tax code provisions to the NCAA’s 
and intercollegiate athletics’ tax exemptions.  He points out that charitable and educational 
institutions are exempted from corporate taxes under section 501(c)(3) of the internal revenue 
code and that this status requires that organizations pass organizational and operational tests.  
Among these are the criteria that an organization is primarily charitable in nature, does not result 
in excessive private benefit, and does not exhibit excessive commercial activity (Colombo, 2010, 
p. 115).   
An important aspect of tax exemption is that it is for an entity, rather than specific 
activities of an organization.  This characteristic has obvious implications for the tax exemption 
for intercollegiate athletics.  Since athletic departments are part of higher education institutions, 
they derive their tax exemption from these institutions.  The tax-exempt status for colleges and 
universities is rarely questioned.  The NCAA’s tax exemption is slightly more nuanced.  As a 
separate entity, it must satisfy the criteria for exemption on its own.  Critics may argue that the 
NCAA violates some of the requirements, like the prohibition of excessive commercial activities.  
For example, the NCAA derives its revenues entirely from commercial activities, 90% of which 
represent its negotiation of television and marketing rights fees (NCAA, 2010a).  To counter 
such arguments, the NCAA focused on two arguments in its response to the Congressional 
inquiry in 2006: the NCAA supports the educational mission of the institutions that they 
represent; and when considering the NCAA’s tax-exempt status, you must consider how 
revenues are spent, rather than the overwhelming size of the revenues generated (NCAA, 2010b).    
Colombo’s (2010) analysis suggests that tax law is adequately complex enough to make 
it difficult to clearly distinguish between what is deserving of tax-exemption and what is not.  He 
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also seems to suggest that since the NCAA and intercollegiate athletics in general are currently 
tax-exempt, their status may be more difficult to revoke.  Nevertheless, it seems likely this issue 
may continue to spark debate and the occasional Congressional inquiry.   
Overall, it should be evident that there are direct and indirect financial effects of athletics 
on institutions that suggest a strong financial connection between the two.  This connection is 
further highlighted by the tax status of intercollegiate athletics.  In addition to these financial 
effects, there are also non-financial effects of athletics on institutions.  These non-financial 
effects are reviewed in the following section.   
Non-financial Effects on Institutions 
 There is a body of literature that looks specifically at non-financial effects of athletics on 
institutions.  Some of this literature explores possible enrollment and academic benefits of 
athletics, while another piece consists of critics lamenting athletics’ place in higher education.   
Advertising effect.  Several studies have examined the potential for academic benefits to 
institutions that participate in athletics and are successful.  These studies generally test the 
hypothesis that an “advertising effect” accompanies athletics success.  In effect, the theory posits 
that colleges and universities participating in college sports and fielding successful teams 
experience positive publicity that translates into more interest and applications from prospective 
students.  This is also sometimes referred to as the “Flutie effect” since the phenomenon was 
distinctly observed at Boston College after quarterback Doug Flutie’s famous touchdown pass in 
a 1984 game. 
Toma and Cross (1998) provide strong evidence of this advertising effect.  They analyze 
the relationship between intercollegiate athletics and the college choice process.  They found that 
winning a national championship in men’s basketball or football was associated with increases in 
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applications to the institutions in subsequent admissions cycles.  Football championships seemed 
to have the more significant impact on applications.  These applications gains were both absolute 
and relative to peer institutions.   
 Toma and Cross (1998) suggest that the positive attention associated with winning 
national championships in the two marquee sports drives the bump in applications.  To support 
their theory, they posit that the championship seasons that could reasonably be tied to a 
compelling story seemed to correspond to the most significant application jumps.   
The ‘good story’ phenomenon holds among basketball champions.  Michigan in 1989 and 
Georgetown in 1984 – the two schools with the most dramatic increases in applications – 
both represented good stories.  Michigan won with a likable interim coach, Steve Fisher, 
named the week of the first round tournament games, and Georgetown won 2 years after 
losing the championship to North Carolina when guard Freddie Brown threw a last-
minute pass directly to a UNC player standing behind him, cinching the game for 
Carolina. (Toma & Cross, 1998, p. 652) 
The good story phenomenon seems to hold for non-championship seasons as well, implying that 
it is not only success, but increased exposure that attracts prospective students.  Toma and Cross 
cite Duke University as an example of this.  Before Duke’s men’s basketball team won back-to-
back national championships in 1991 and 1992, it was receiving positive attention in the media 
for its rise to prominence.  This positive attention was associated with applications increases 
(Toma & Cross, 1998, p. 653).  
 The basic finding that intercollegiate athletic program success may affect the college 
choice decisions of prospective students is very interesting.  It is perhaps rare for an auxiliary 
enterprise to have this type of effect on prospective students.  Toma and Cross’s (1998) study 
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was conducted using 1972 to 1992 national champions, so the data is somewhat dated now.  
There have been significant advances in how students gather information about higher education 
institutions in the years since their sample was taken.  A critique of their study might question 
whether their results would hold today.  For example, has the use of the internet to gather 
information about schools affected the tendency of students’ college choice decisions to be 
affected by athletic success?  Perhaps the increased availability of information has even 
increased the exposure of “good stories,” thus increasing the effect on students’ college choice 
decisions. 
 Other studies have tested the power of the “advertising effect” by looking for evidence 
that athletics participation and success can actually enhance the student profile.  The general idea 
is that the publicity attracts more applicants from which colleges and universities select better 
students.  These studies are essentially taking Toma and Cross’s (1998) study one step further to 
determine if institutions are able to capitalize on the expanded applicant pool.  The standard 
measure of student quality used in these studies is the SAT scores of incoming freshmen.   
 McCormick and Tinsley (1987) evaluate this theory.  They found evidence that 
participation in big-time athletics and successful football programs, measured by winning 
percentage, was positively associated with SAT scores of incoming freshmen.  Participating in 
major college sports was associated with a 3% increase in SAT scores on average across their 
various model specifications.  McCormick and Tinsley believed that their findings provided 
evidence that sports compliments, rather than degrades, the academic mission of higher 
education institutions:   
The evidence presented here is consistent with the view that some students get more than 
one education while enrolled in college; intercollegiate athletic competition is a natural 
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consequence and byproduct of undergraduate education.  This implies that athletic 
success can often go hand in hand with academic success, and, insofar as this study goes, 
critics of athletic success are misguided if their motive is the academic improvement of 
the university. (McCormick & Tinsley, 1987, p. 1108) 
One of the drawbacks of McCormick and Tinsley’s (1987) study is the age of the data.  
Generalizing the results from 1971 data to today may present some issues.  However, other 
studies have resulted in similar findings.  Mixon (1995) used 1992 data to conclude that 
basketball success, as measured by the number of rounds played in the NCAA tournament, was 
positively associated with SAT scores.  This validates McCormick and Tinsley’s findings and 
supports the idea that “athletics may indeed enhance the mission of a university, by attracting 
quality students to campus” (Mixon, 1995, Conclusions section, para. 1). 
 This positive relationship between athletics and SAT scores is not, however, consistent 
throughout the literature.  Bremmer and Kesselring (1993) challenge the results of McCormick 
and Tinsley (1987).  Bremmer and Kesselring (1993) used more recent data – 1989 versus 1971 
– to test the effect of athletics on SAT scores.  Whereas McCormick and Tinsley find that simple 
participation in big-time athletics and football success, as measured by a 15-year winning 
percentage, was positively associated with SAT scores, Bremmer and Kesselring found no 
significant relationship between participation or football success measured by the number of 
bowl games played and SAT scores.  Bremmer and Kesselring also evaluated basketball success, 
using the number of appearances in the NCAA tournament as the independent variable.  They 
found no relationship between basketball success and freshmen SAT scores, although Mixon 
(1995) would later challenge these claims while using a slightly different variable (i.e., number 
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of rounds played in the NCAA tournament).  Similarly, Tucker and Amato (1993) could not 
confirm the significant relationship between athletics and SAT scores.   
 Tucker (2005) posits that the “advertising effect” may actually change over time.  Tucker 
looked at the relationship between athletics and the SAT scores of incoming freshmen in 1991 
and found no significant relationship.  However, he also evaluated this relationship after the 1995 
changes to the college football bowl system and found that an institution’s football success had a 
positive and statistically significant relationship with SAT scores.  Changes to the relationship 
over time may explain why there are seemingly contradictory results from studies looking at 
different time periods. 
 Some evidence suggests that athletics success impacts student outcomes as well, like the 
retention and graduation rates of the student body.  Although these outcomes benefit institutions, 
they are primarily related to students and will be discussed in subsequent sections.   
Critics of Athletics in Higher Education 
 The literature also includes general critiques of intercollegiate athletics.  These pieces are 
generally not peer-reviewed, but it is important to acknowledge their existence since they may 
add to the understanding of the current state of intercollegiate athletics.  Sperber (2000) fits into 
this category.  The title alone – “Beer and Circus: How Big-time College Sports is Crippling 
Undergraduate Education” – gives readers a pretty good idea of what Sperber’s thoughts are the 
effects of athletics on higher education.  One nuance mentioned in the title that deserves specific 
mention is the descriptor “big-time” college sports.  Sperber‘s critique is specific to the largest 
athletic programs, and he gives no indication that he objects to all forms of intercollegiate 
athletics on college campuses. 
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 Sperber (2000) describes a deterioration of undergraduate education in America’s college 
and universities since 1970 and attempts to tie this decline to the rise of big-time college sports.  
Sperber also blames alcohol’s prominence on college campuses for this decline.  These two 
elements – alcohol and athletics – are the beer and circus referenced in the title.  Sperber links 
these two elements in his description to one of the common explanations for why college and 
universities participate in athletics.  He explains that athletics are often cited as contributing to 
the quality of student life on college campuses.  “’Quality of life’ is often a code word for 
student partying in conjunction with college sports events” (Sperber, 2000, p. 65).   
Sperber (2000) talks critically about one of the potential benefits discussed in other 
literature: the advertising effect.  While not denying the existence of an advertising effect of 
winning athletic teams, Sperber questioned the wisdom in actively pursuing such an effect when 
there was no guarantee of producing a winning team and there appeared to be a converse effect 
of losing teams or scandals that could negate any previous applications gains.  Sperber was also 
troubled by survey results showing that more students responded that they were well informed 
about the athletic programs than those that responded that they were well informed about the 
undergraduate education programs at the schools to which they applied (p. 62).  Overall, 
Sperber’s book highlights his belief that there may be a significant non-financial cost to 
intercollegiate athletics in their current form, namely the deterioration of undergraduate 
education.   
James Duderstadt, former president of the University of Michigan, may also be 
considered a critic of intercollegiate athletics in their current form.  While his critiques may be 
less severe than Sperber’s (2000), Duderstadt (2000) identifies what he believes is the 
fundamental problem with intercollegiate athletics: 
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The key flaw in intercollegiate athletics as we conduct it today is its independence from 
and irrelevance to the educational mission and academic values of our universities.  Big-
time football and basketball are, in reality, commercial entertainment enterprises that 
have absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with the educational mission of universities. 
(pp. 265-266) 
 In addition to commercialization and professionalism, Duderstadt (2000) is also 
specifically critical of the lack of control of athletics activities by institutions, acknowledging 
that this is not a new phenomenon (p. 267), which is supported by the Carnegie Report of 1929 
(Savage et al., 1929).  Related to the inability to control intercollegiate athletics, Duderstadt 
describes the “financial firewall” that separates athletic and academic budgets (p. 145).  He 
views this as problematic because it places an emphasis on revenue generation rather than cost 
control, and “perhaps most significantly, it further widens the gap between the athletic 
department and the rest of the university” (p. 145). 
 Interestingly, Duderstadt (2000) does not place the blame for the problems found in 
intercollegiate athletics on athletic directors, coaches, and players.  Instead he identifies faculty, 
governing boards, and presidents as the primary sources of blame (p. xi).  While he claims that 
coaches and athletic directors are simply “responding to their marching orders” and acting on the 
incentives and opportunities that exist, he is more critical of university presidents as choosing the 
path of least resistance rather than taking on the difficult challenge of aligning athletic activities 
with the educational mission (p. 296).  Of course, a counter critique to this view is that 
Duderstadt, himself, was a university president at an institution that participates in big-time 
college sports, and was evidently unsuccessful in implementing the types of reforms that he 
proposes in his book. 
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 The various calls for reform, like the Carnegie Report of 1929 and the Knight 
Commission Reports more recently, are also evidence that there are those that are critical of 
aspects of intercollegiate athletics (Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, 1993; 
Savage et al., 1929).  It is worth noting that these critics, including Sperber (2000) and 
Duderstadt (2000), are not critical of all aspects of athletics, and may even believe that 
intercollegiate athletics should be a part of higher education, just in a reformed state. 
Discussion of Effects on Institutions  
 The research shows that institutions might benefit economically and academically from 
their athletics programs.  Through increases in private gifts and even state appropriations, 
athletics may bring financial resources into their host institutions (e.g., Baade and Sundberg, 
1996; Grimes and Chressanthis, 1994; Humphrey and Mondello, 2007; Humphreys, 2006).  The 
literature also shows that the popularity of college sports and the publicity that they bring might 
lead to non-economic benefits for institutions (e.g., Toma and Cross, 1998; McCormick and 
Tinsley, 1987; Mixon, 1995; Tucker, 2005).  Institutions may benefit from increased 
applications, while also enhancing the student profile by attracting more desirable students.   
Although there is not complete consensus throughout the literature reviewed in this 
section, one of the strengths is the relative consistency of findings.  For example, multiple studies 
finding evidence of a positive relationship between athletics success and applications or financial 
gifts enhances the confidence in these findings.  On the other hand, one of the concerns about 
this body of literature is its generalizability.  Many of the studies focus specifically on the effects 
of successful athletics programs.  In reality, not all athletics programs can be successful.  Toma 
and Cross (1998) provides strong evidence of the advertising effect of successful college sports, 
but they are narrowly defining success as national championship teams.  A related limitation of 
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this body of literature is the tendency to focus on big-time college sports participants, which are 
typically defined as NCAA Division I member institutions.  The samples in many of the studies 
reviewed in this section do not include data from NCAA Division II and Division III member 
institutions.  In considering benefits to institutions, like the advertising effect, it is important to 
note that they may not be consistently observed. 
Effects of Intercollegiate Athletics on Student-athletes 
 Student-athletes are perhaps the primary stakeholder in intercollegiate athletics.  It is not 
surprising that they are also perhaps the most affected by their participation in college sports.  
The literature suggests that student-athletes also realize economic and social/academic benefits 
from their ties to athletics. 
Economic Effects on Student-athletes 
The economic effects of college sports on the student-athlete participants are the topic of 
some research and much discussion.  In fact, the topic is dominated by an ongoing debate.  
Questions about paying college athletes spark passionate responses on both sides of the issue.  
Unfortunately, there is very little academic literature on the topic outside of legal analyses (e.g., 
Goplerud, 1997).  Despite the lack of academic literature, a brief description of recent 
developments in the debate about paying college athletes may provide useful context.   
 Arguments for paying college athletes have been advanced by coaches, former players, 
and current players recently and have received much publicity.  Steve Spurrier, football coach at 
the University of South Carolina, proposed to pay a per game stipend to his football players from 
his salary.  His proposal was supported unanimously by his SEC coaching peers, but of course, it 
cannot be acted on under current NCAA rules (Associated Press, 2012).   
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The legal case of former UCLA basketball player Ed O’Bannon has received much of the 
attention in the debate of paying college athletes recently.  The class action lawsuit, in which 
O’Bannon is a named plaintiff, seeks damages for former players from the use of their images 
and likenesses.  The O'Bannon case's initial focus was on the use of players' likenesses in video 
games; however, a settlement was announced in November, 2013 that included EA Sports and 
Collegiate Licensing Company (Mandel, 2014; Staples, 2013).  The case now is focused on the 
NCAA and broadcasting rights, which is the bigger piece of the potential judgment, with 
estimates exceeding $3 billion (Berkowitz, 2013).  While individual institutions are not 
defendants in the case, they nevertheless have a vested interest in its outcome, and the NCAA 
has utilized supportive letters from nine university presidents in its argument for summary 
judgment in its favor (Berkowitz, 2013).   
In January, 2014, a unionization petition and union cards from an undisclosed number of 
football players were submitted on behalf of players at Northwestern University in a bid for 
recognition by the National Labor Relations Board as a group with collective bargaining rights 
(Farrey, 2014).  In addition to compensation consideration, the organization spearheading the 
effort, the College Athletes Players Association, also seeks to collectively bargain on other 
reform issues including medical coverage, minimizing the risk of traumatic brain injury, 
improving graduation rates, and securing due process rights for athletes (College Athletes 
Players Association, n.d.).  Both the NCAA and Northwestern University have asserted that 
athletes are not employees of the university, and are thus not eligible for collective bargaining.  
The issue of paying college athletes appears only to be becoming more complex in recent 
years, as evidenced by the various strands it has taken: coaches' proposals, legal cases, and 
unionization bid.  While there is little peer reviewed literature on the topic, it is nevertheless 
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important to the dynamic of intercollegiate athletics.  There may be a temptation to classify the 
debate as an NCAA corporate issue, and not necessarily central to the relationship between 
intercollegiate athletics and institutions.  However, depending on the outcomes of the various 
negotiations and legal proceedings, the issue of paying athletes has the potential to alter college 
sports at its core.  The fact that university presidents are looking to assert the best interests of 
their institutions in court documents signifies that they understand that the outcomes could have 
far reaching effects.   
The literature shows that the possible economic effects of athletics on student-athletes 
extend beyond their college experience.  Long and Caudill (1991) found that male athletes 
earned 4% higher incomes than non-athletes in their early careers.  Female athletes did not earn a 
statistically significant premium.  Long and Caudill use human capital theory to suggest that 
athletic participation may help athletes acquire nonacademic skills and traits that enhance their 
earning power. Human capital is the skills, abilities, and other attributes that an individual brings 
to the labor market and human capital theory posits that employers will seek to invest in human 
capital through their hiring and training practices.  “Since earnings are gross of the return on 
human capital, some persons may earn more than others simply because they invest more in 
themselves” (Becker, 1962, p. 48).  Long and Caudill (1991) use human capital theory to suggest 
that the premiums earned by student-athletes may be attributable to the acquisition of skills and 
attributes valued by the labor market that are not academic in nature: 
Participation in college athletics may enhance self-control, perseverance and discipline, 
and may prepare the future employee to follow orders and cooperate in "team" production 
which increases efficiency (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Athletes may develop exercise, 
eating, and drinking habits that lead to better health and earnings potential than non-
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athletes. Lastly, varsity athletes may have relatively more "competitive" drive that 
ultimately results in greater career accomplishments, other things the same. (p. 526) 
 Long and Caudill used aggregate athletics data and did not differentiate revenue sports 
from nonrevenue sports.  A critique of their study may suggest that the small percentage of male 
athletes who became professional football or basketball players were skewing the results.  The 
NCAA reports that only 1.8% of college football players and 1.2% of men’s basketball players 
become professional athletes (NCAA, 2009a).  However, the high salaries of this subgroup may 
very well skew the early career earnings for male athletes.  The age of the data is also a concern 
with Long and Caudill’s study.  Their sample included student-athletes that entered college in 
1971.  Looking at more recent data and earnings later in the career may yield interesting results 
and would help provide a more accurate picture of the true relationship. 
Even if the premium earned by male athletes is not attributable to a professional athlete 
effect, there may be other explanations.  Pascarella and Terenzini (2005) address a similar 
phenomenon when looking at the premiums earned by college graduates.  Though it is difficult 
to pinpoint a single explanation, they list human capital theory, screening-certification, and 
credentialing as possible explanations.  Screening-certification simply implies that employers use 
a given characteristic, like a college diploma or athletic status, as evidence that an individual has 
the “requisite competencies and values necessary for successful adaptation to complex technical 
and managerial jobs” (Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005, p. 445).  Screening-certification represents 
especially interesting possibilities when trying to explain the premium to male athletes.  
Screening may suggest that employers use a student-athlete’s successful completion of an 
athletic career as an indicator of desirable traits, like dedication, focus, and motivation.  
Pascarella and Terenzini describe credentialing as “the earnings bonus for completing the 
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bachelor’s degree above and beyond the economic return for having the equivalent of four years 
of college (that is, 120 credits) but not completing a bachelor’s degree” (p. 456).  Credentialing 
implies that employers’ decisions may not always be based on a rationale assessment of an 
employee’s skills and abilities.  Instead, the credential itself is valued.  In terms of athletics, the 
credential may simply be an individual’s status as a former athlete.  It seems reasonable to 
assume that some employers may give preferential treatment to the former athletes whom they 
watched, admired, or rooted for.  Regardless of the explanation, it is important to note the 
relationship between athletic participation and earnings for male athletes.  Both the research 
findings and the current status of the ongoing debate about paying athletes are informative of the 
potential financial effects of athletics participation on student-athletes.  To be sure, these 
financial effects are not the only effects of athletic participation evident in the literature. 
Academic and Social Effects on Student-athletes 
 There is a large body of literature that considers the academic and social outcomes of 
athletics participation in higher education.  The impacts on student-athletes’ cognitive 
development and learning outcomes is included in this literature.  While the results are somewhat 
inconsistent, much of the evidence associates athletic participation with negative outcomes 
(Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005). 
 Astin (1993) broadly showed that athletic participation in college was negatively linked 
with graduate school entrance exam scores, like the verbal portion of the Graduate Record 
Examination (GRE), Law School Aptitude Test (LSAT), and National Teachers’ Examination.  
McBride and Reed (1998) similarly found that student-athletes, both male and female, had 
significantly lower critical thinking skills than non-athletes.  McBride and Reed also found that 
male football and basketball players made lower gains in critical thinking skills during college 
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than non-athletes.  However, a major weakness of both of these studies was that they did not 
account for confounding factors, like socioeconomic background and academic abilities, so these 
studies do not indicate whether the differences can be directly attributed to athletic participation. 
Pascarella, Bohr, Nora, and Terenzini (1995) also looked at the cognitive impacts of 
athletic participation, focusing on the impacts in the first year.  They controlled for confounding 
factors and found that male football and basketball players had significantly lower scores on end-
of-first-year measures of reading comprehension and mathematics than non-athletes and even 
their counterparts that participated in nonrevenue sports.  Pacarella et al. (1999) went on to show 
that similar results held for athletes after their second and third years.  End-of-second-year 
writing skills scores were significantly lower for athletes in football and men’s basketball than 
non-athletes, but scores for male athletes in nonrevenue sports were not significantly different 
from non-athletes (Pascarella et al., 1999).  Similarly, football and men’s basketball players had 
significantly lower end-of-third-year net reading comprehension and critical thinking scores than 
non-athletes; nonrevenue athletes’ scores were once again not significantly different from non-
athletes’ scores(Pascarella et al., 1999). 
 One of the more interesting aspects of the Astin (1993), Pascarella et al. (1995), and 
Pascarella et al. (1999) studies were their findings related to female athletes.  While athletic 
participation for women was found to be associated with lower general measures of cognitive 
development (Astin) and end-of-first-year measures (Pascarella et al., 1995), the same did not 
hold true for end-of-second-year and end-of-third-year measures (Pascarella et al., 1999).   
There is some evidence that the gap in cognitive development for football and men’s 
basketball players’ compared to non-athlete students may widen as they matriculate through 
college.  Pascarella et al. (1999) compared the end-of-second-year and end-of-third-year gaps 
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with Pascarella et al.’s (1995) first-year studies and found that the gap was actually greater for 
second and third year measures than first year scores.   
While the literature is dominated by football and men’s basketball, there is evidence that 
athletic participation impacts athletes in nonrevenue sports as well.  Wolniak, Pierson, and 
Pascarella (2001) looked at the relationship between male athletic participation and four learning 
outcomes: Openness to Diversity and Challenge; Learning for Self-Understanding; Internal 
Locus of Attribution for Academic Success; and Preference for Higher Order Cognitive 
Activities.  They found that, while football and basketball players did not show significant 
disadvantages compared to non-athletes, nonrevenue athletes did.   
[Nonrevenue athletes] tended to be the outlier group in terms of growth in learning 
orientations.  Compared to their nonathlete counterparts, men participating in nonrevenue 
sports tended to be disadvantaged between .25 to .30 of a standard deviation in Openness 
to Diversity and between .21 to .51 of a standard deviation in Learning for Self-
Understanding. (p. 619) 
Not all of the evidence suggests a negative effect of intercollegiate athletic participation.  
Some studies have failed to find significant relationships or even positive associations.  Gaston 
Gayles (2004), for example, showed that while academic motivation, ACT scores, and ethnicity 
were significant in predicting the GPA’s of student-athletes, athletic motivation was not.  In 
other words, athletes’ motivation to excel in their sports was not significantly related to their 
academic performance.  This does not concur with the findings of Simons, Van Rheenen, and 
Covington (1999), which suggested that athletic motivation detracted from academic 
performance.  It seems somewhat counterintuitive as well; one would expect the most motivated 
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athletes to spend more time pursuing their athletic ambitions at the expense of preparing for their 
courses.  However, Gaston Gayles’ results suggest otherwise.   
Umbach, Palmer, Kuh, and Hannah (2006) also showed that not all outcomes associated 
with athletic participation are negative.  They found that student-athletes seemed to be as 
engaged in educationally purposeful activities as non-athletes.  Male student-athletes were “as 
challenged academically, interact with faculty as frequently, and participate as often in active 
and collaborative learning activities” (Umbach et al., 2006, p. 718).  Similar results were found 
for female student-athletes, with female athletes even showing an increased likelihood to interact 
with faculty and participate in active and collaborative learning activities compared to female 
non-athletes (Umbach et al., 2006, p. 718). 
Other studies point out additional positive outcomes related to intercollegiate athletic 
participation.  For example, studies have provided evidence that student-athletes are often more 
satisfied with their college experiences than non-athletes (Pascarella & Smart, 1991; Astin, 
1993).  Pascarella and Smart (1991) also found that athletes showed higher levels of social 
involvement during college and post-college self-esteem.  This evidence suggests that, while 
studies have linked athletic participation with negative learning and cognitive development 
outcomes, athletic participation may result in other types of benefits for student-athletes. 
Some of the previously discussed studies include evidence of conditional effects of 
athletic participation, but a few additional conditional effects deserve mention.  Research has 
compared student-athlete experiences at different types of institutions.  Bowen and Levin (2003), 
for example, looked at Ivy League institutions and concluded that student-athletes at highly 
selective institutions do not have the same collegiate experiences as non-athletes.  While it 
makes sense that institution type would play a role in student-athlete experience, Umbach et al. 
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(2006) contradicts these findings.  They found that student-athletes and non-athletes appeared to 
experience similar educational practices at all institution types within Divisions I, II, and III.  
However, they did find evidence that student-athlete experiences differed across divisions.  
Student-athletes at Division III institutions experienced higher levels of academic challenge, are 
more likely to interact with faculty, and are more likely to engage in active and collaborative 
learning activities than their student-athlete counterparts at Division I institutions (Umbach et al., 
2006, p. 720).  This is a result of students at Division III institutions in general being more likely 
to experience these outcomes.  In other words, student-athletes’ experiences may vary across 
divisions, but they may not differ within divisions.  This study is also significant because it is 
one of the few that considers differences between the NCAA divisions. 
Pascarella and Smart (1991) also looked at conditional effects, comparing the outcomes 
for African American student-athletes and Caucasian student-athletes.  They found some 
evidence that intercollegiate athletic participation had stronger positive effects on social 
involvement and social self-esteem for African American males than Caucasian males 
(Pascarella & Smart, 1991, p. 129).  Gaston Gayles and Hu (2009) is a more recent study that 
also found conditional effects of intercollegiate athletic participation.  Their study looked at the 
relationships between student-athletes’ background characteristics, engagement in educational 
activities, and cognitive and affective outcomes.  They found that female and Black student-
athletes reported higher levels of self-concept compared to male and White student-athletes 
(Gaston Gayles & Hu, 2009, p. 326).  They also found that student-athletes in high profile sports, 
like men’s football and basketball, reported less positive cultural attitudes compared to student-
athletes in low profile, nonrevenue sports (Gaston Gayles & Hu, 2006, p. 324).  These studies 
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show that the effects of intercollegiate athletic participation may be conditional on students’ 
background and demographic characteristics, as well as the type of sport that they play. 
 Intercollegiate athletics’ effects on academic performance and graduation rates are one of 
the more interesting areas of research.  Evaluating academic performance of student-athletes 
versus non-athletes is one of the most basic studies that falls in this category.  Maloney and 
McCormick (1993) looked at this comparison and found that athletes perform worse than non-
athletes, even after accounting for their lower entrance exam scores and poorer preparation 
(Maloney & McCormick, 1993).  The study goes further to look at in-season effects on academic 
performance.  Perhaps not surprisingly, they found that athletes in football and men’s basketball 
performed worse than non-athletes during their season.  The disadvantage equates to a full letter 
grade in half of their classes (Maloney & McCormick, 1993, p. 566).  On the other hand, athletes 
in football and men’s basketball perform slightly better than non-athletes during the off-season, 
but not enough to offset the negative in-season effects.  This makes sense as student-athletes are 
bound to spend more time practicing and participating in games during their season.  
Interestingly, the in-season effect does not hold for athletes in nonrevenue sports.  Maloney and 
McCormick suggest that this can be attributed to coaches and administrators not putting as much 
pressure on the athletes in nonrevenue sports to perform (Maloney & McCormick, 1993, p. 567). 
Intercollegiate athletics’ effects on graduation rates are one of the more controversial 
topics covered in the literature. The NCAA is perhaps responsible for some confusion on the 
topic.  They report graduation rates of student-athletes using a measure that they developed: the 
graduation success rate (GSR).  This measure is necessarily greater than or equal to standard 
graduation rates since it allows institutions to subtract students who leave but would have been 
academically eligible had they returned.   
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 Not surprisingly, much attention has been paid to the graduation rates of college athletes.  
The NCAA itself, as indicated by its special measurement, pays attention to graduation rates.  In 
a November 2009 press release, the NCAA declared that student-athlete graduation rates had 
reached an all-time high and were higher than the rates of the general student body (NCAA, 
2009b).  In fact, there is scholarly research that supports this assertion.  Long and Caudill (1991) 
showed that, overall, men and women athletes graduated at higher rates than non-athletes.  
However, the NCAA data shows that graduation rates can vary dramatically by sport (NCAA, 
2009c). 
DeBrock, Hendricks, and Koenker (1996) linked the graduation rates of student-athletes 
to their unique labor market opportunities, namely professional sports.  They found evidence that 
graduation rates for student-athletes were impacted by the same influences as other students at 
the same institutions, but were reduced by opportunities in professional sports.  For this reason, 
DeBrock, Hendricks, and Koenker conclude that absolute comparisons of graduation rates for 
student-athletes and regular students might not be a meaningful analysis.  This study indirectly 
indicates that student-athletes benefit from labor market opportunities that do not exist for non-
athlete students. 
Discussion of Effects on Student-athletes 
 Student-athletes are perhaps the most affected stakeholders of intercollegiate athletics.  
Participation in college sports was found to be associated with both positive and negative 
outcomes in the literature.  The strength of this body of literature is that the outcomes that are 
considered are varied and widespread.  From an economic advantage represented by higher 
early-career earnings to various academic and social outcomes, there is at least some evidence 
for a wide range of potential outcomes of athletic participation for student-athletes.  A potential 
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weakness of this body of literature may be the perceived importance of the findings.  The 
economic outcomes are highlighted by a 4% early-career earnings premium for male student-
athletes.  Even if this premium represents a lasting effect, it may be viewed as a relatively small 
difference.  Similarly, the higher satisfaction rates that student-athletes have with their college 
experiences might not be viewed as important.  Other relatoinships presented in the literature are 
conditional or group-specific.  These potential limitations may raise the question of whether this 
body of literature highlights meaningful, lasting outcomes of athletics participations on student-
athletes. 
Effects of Intercollegiate Athletics on Other Stakeholders 
 Higher education institutions and student-athletes are the primary stakeholders in 
intercollegiate athletics, but there are also other groups affected by their relationships with 
college sports.  At least one of these groups, coaches, has an obvious relationship, while others, 
like non-athlete students and the communities that host sporting events, may also be affected by 
their relationships with college sports.  The literature related to how these groups are impacted 
by athletics is less developed, but it is still possible to identify some likely ways in which each 
group is affected. 
Coaches 
College coaches, especially in the main revenue-generating sports of football and men’s 
basketball, appear to receive substantial economic benefits from intercollegiate athletics.  
Coaches’ salaries in excess of $1 million are not uncommon in big-time college sports.  The 
University of Alabama paid its head football coach $5.5 million in 2012 (USA Today, 2012).  
Supply and demand economics would predict that high salaries result from insufficient supply to 
meet the demand for quality coaches, yet many coaches earn large sums of money while leading 
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mediocre programs.  In other words, their performance does not indicate skills that they are in 
short supply.  Sperber (1990) reflects on this phenomenon and recognizes that there are superstar 
coaches that bring unique skills and superior results to their programs, but for every superstar, 
there are dozens of coaches with mediocre results also earning high salaries.  In short, labor 
markets for big-time college coaches, at least on the surface, do not appear to be controlled by 
competitive supply and demand forces.   
The economics literature also suggests that coaches’ salaries are so high because of 
NCAA restraints on the labor market (i.e., student athlete compensation).  These labor market 
restraints are a main reason that some economists consider the NCAA an economic cartel (e.g., 
Eckard, 1998; Farmer & Pecorino, 2010; Fleisher, Goff, & Tollison, 2002; Fort & Quirk, 1995; 
Koch, 1971, 1973, 1983).  A cartel is simply a group of firms colluding to maximize profits 
(Miller & Meiners, 1986).  Collusion is illegal in the United States under the Sherman Antitrust 
Act of 1890, which is the focus of the ongoing O’Bannon v. NCAA legal case discussed earlier. 
Farmer and Pecorino (2010) directly suggest that the cartel agreement to restrict 
compensation to athletes raises coaches’ salaries.  Zimbalist (2006) makes the comparison of the 
labor markets of college and professional sports: 
How much do you think MLB managers would be paid if every major league team was 
exempt from taxes, was supported by million-dollar operating subsidies from both a 
university and a state budget and the players’ salaries were constrained by law to be no 
higher than $40,000 annually. (p. 281) 
High salaries and an uncompetitive labor market may lead to significant economic benefits to 
college coaches.  There may be additional effects of athletics on coaches that have not been 
explored in the literature yet, and not all are necessarily positive (e.g., health effects). 
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Non-athlete Students 
Non-athlete students may also be impacted by the athletics programs at their institutions.  
One of the more interesting studies involving intercollegiate athletics and graduation rates 
actually looks at the relationship between athletic program success and the graduation rates of 
the general student population.  Mangold, Bean, and Adams (2003) relied heavily on Tinto’s 
(1975) model of student persistence for their theoretical framework in this study.  They 
specifically focused on the role that interactions and integration play in creating commitment, 
which leads to persistence.  They point out that student involvement inside and outside the 
classroom leads to integration and institutional commitment under Tinto’s model.  
“Intercollegiate sports such as football and basketball are often viewed as catalysts for student 
interaction, thus facilitating social involvement and ultimately enhancing student institutional 
affiliation and commitment” (Mangold et al., 2003, p. 543).   
 The researchers went on to test their hypothesis that successful athletic programs would 
spawn interactions among students, leading to higher levels of commitment and persistence.  
However, their results failed to support the hypothesis.  In fact, they found that basketball 
success and strong overall sports programs are negatively associated with graduation rates, while 
football success had a positive but nonsignificant relationship with graduation rates (Mangold et 
al., 2003).  These findings are very interesting and seem to suggest that athletic programs do not 
provide the types of interactions that lead to academic integration and persistence under Tinto’s 
model.  In fact, Mangold et al. (2003) suggest that while athletics may produce peer interactions, 
the type of interactions may be detrimental to academic integration.   
It follows that such ties could, and most likely would be utilized by students to persuade 
their peers to participate in recreational group activities directly related to the emergent 
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success of their schools intercollegiate athletic team (pep rallies, or viewing athletic 
competition in group setting), even when such participation might conflict with demands 
tied to overall academic success (preparing for an exam, or writing a paper). (p. 555) 
Their rationale seems to be consistent with Astin’s (1993) assertion that peers have the most 
influence on college students. 
  However, Mixon and Trevino (2005) contradict these findings.  They actually found 
evidence supporting Mangold et al.’s (2003) original hypothesis.  Mixon and Trevino found that 
football success had a positive and statistically significant relationship with freshman retention 
rates and graduation rates.  This finding appears to run counter to the conventional wisdom that 
students choose to follow a successful football team at the expense of academics.  Mixon and 
Trevino conclude: 
Our evidence supports the “football chicken soup” hypothesis, as opposed to the “football 
fever” idea supported in previous work, in that football appears to (perhaps) expand a 
university’s/college’s opportunity set and provide students with a respite from the 
psychic costs associated with college life. (pp. 101-102) 
While the evidence is inconsistent, it is important to note that athletics may produce outcomes 
for the vast majority of higher education students that do not participate in college sports. 
Local Communities 
The local communities surrounding higher education institutions might also be expected 
to benefit from hosting athletics events.  Economic impact studies are fairly common in athletics 
and are often used to justify taxpayer support for professional sports stadiums.  Likewise, one 
might expect collegiate sports to produce significant economic impacts, but the evidence 
supporting this hypothesis is inconsistent at best.   
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Baade, Baumann, and Matheson (2011) looked at the effects of intercollegiate athletics 
events on local economies in Florida.  Basketball games at the University of Florida and Florida 
State University were not associated with a significant increase in economic activity.  Football 
games were associated with a $2 million increase in taxable sales in the host city.  However, 
there was evidence that this increase may be offset by decreases in economic activity in the rest 
of the state of Florida.  Baade, Baumann, and Matheson conclude that, although taxable sales 
increase, large public subsidies are not justified by the relatively small increase. 
Coates and Depken (2009) also considered the economic impact of intercollegiate 
athletics on local economies.  They specifically considered the effects of football contests at four 
institutions in the state of Texas: University of Texas at Austin, Texas A&M University, Texas 
Tech University, and Baylor University.  Their findings were consistent with Baade, Baumann, 
and Matheson (2011), with neither study producing evidence that intercollegiate athletic events 
have sizeable effects on economic activity in the local community.  In fact, Coates and Depken 
found evidence that some events expected to lead to positive economic impacts actually had 
negative relationships with sales tax revenues.  They found that the rivalry games between Texas 
and Texas A&M were associated with a decrease of $410 thousand in sales tax revenues when 
played in Austin and a decrease of $55 thousand when played in College Station.  Although local 
communities might be expected to benefit significantly from hosting intercollegiate athletics 
events, there is only marginal and inconsistent evidence supporting this hypothesis. 
Professional Sports Leagues 
The professional sports leagues also have a stake in college sports.  On the surface it 
seems that they benefit in very direct ways.  College sports develop players and provide scouting 
opportunities for professional teams.  This is especially true in football and men’s basketball.  
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The National Football League (NFL) and the National Basketball Association (NBA) do not 
have developed minor league systems that perform these functions.  Interestingly, it is Major 
League Baseball, which has a robust player development system, that provides the only subsidy, 
though modest, to the NCAA for this service (Zimbalist, 1999).  Intercollegiate athletics 
essentially serve these functions with no cost to the professional leagues, representing a 
potentially large economic benefit.   
This relationship, in addition to being intuitive, is supported in theory.  Fort and Quirk 
(1995) and others have described professional team sports as business cartels.  One of the 
behaviors of a cartel is to control its inputs.  Through age and other eligibility requirements, the 
NFL and NBA essentially force a large percentage of their future players into intercollegiate 
athletics where they can be developed and scouted.  This reduces the risk to these leagues.   
Discussion of Effects on Other Stakeholders 
Still other outcomes of intercollegiate athletics do not fit neatly into a single stakeholder 
group.  Adler and Adler (1988), while studying loyalty, found that college athletics espoused 
intense loyalty: 
The type of loyalty we have discussed here, as noted earlier, is different from that found 
in most other organizations.  College athletic teams generate an intense loyalty that 
surpasses the more bland forms of organizational commitment commonly found in 
ordinary organizations. (p. 413)  
The results of their case study attributed the development of this loyalty to five conceptual 
elements: domination, identification, commitment, integration, and goal alignment.  It is not 
clear which stakeholders primarily benefit from this loyalty, but it seems to be a positive 
outcome that potentially benefits everyone involved. 
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The literature related to the outcomes of intercollegiate athletics for other stakeholders 
besides higher education institutions and student-athletes is relatively underdeveloped.  Some of 
the outcomes that have been researched, like the impact of college sporting events on local 
economies, are underwhelming.  It may be the case that the outcomes for coaches, professional 
sports leagues, and others are very robust, but there simply has not been adequate research to 
support them.  The outcomes for these stakeholder groups represent a potential area for future 
research. 
Discussion of the Effects of Athletics 
 One of the themes throughout the body of literature that investigates the effects of 
intercollegiate athletics is that these outcomes are not always clear-cut.  Some studies contradict 
each other, making it difficult to identify consistent findings that can be reported with 
confidence.  Nevertheless, the research provides evidence that higher education institutions and 
student-athletes, the two most prominent stakeholders of intercollegiate athletics, may experience 
both economic and academic/social outcomes as a result of their participation in athletics.  
Furthermore, both positive and negative outcomes are evidenced in the literature. 
It is important to note that not all of the outcomes to intercollegiate athletics are 
economic.  The commercialization of college sports receives attention in the media and this may 
make it convenient to only think of the benefits and costs of athletics in economic terms.  A 
strength of the literature reviewed here is that it avoids this trap and identifies many non-
economic outcomes of athletics.  Studies considering the effects of athletic success on 
applications and student body composition (e.g., Toma & Cross, 1998; McCormick & Tinsley, 
1987; Mixon, 1995; Bremmer & Kesselring, 1993) are indicative of the literature’s broad scope.   
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 Three distinct limitations raise concerns about this body of literature.  Issues of 
generalizability, significance, and completeness are common throughout the literature.  The 
question of generalizability is raised by sampling biases in the studies.  Many studies only 
include big-time college sports, typically defined as NCAA Division I programs, in their 
samples.  This is likely a result of data availability.  However, findings based on Division I data 
may not be generalizable to Division II and III institutions or student-athletes.  Division I 
accounts for only 31% of all NCAA institutions and there are significant differences in the 
profiles of the institutions that comprise each division (NCAA, 2009d).   
In addition to a potential sampling bias, much of the research on this topic is narrowly 
focused on the benefits of athletic success.  These specific benefits, no matter how robust they 
are, can only be realized by institutions that experience athletics success.  The number of 
successful teams and programs may be a fairly limited number of institutions.  Toma and Cross 
(1998), for example, only consider the effects of national championship seasons in men’s 
basketball and football on applications.  This is the ultimate measure of success.  Only two 
institutions per year, one from each sport, experience this degree of success.  The age of many of 
the studies reviewed here also raises concerns about the generalizability to present day 
conditions.  Higher education and intercollegiate athletics have changed considerably in recent 
years, so findings based on data that is more than ten years old may simply not hold today.  
These concerns about the generalizability of the studies to a broad population of institutions, 
student-athletes, or other stakeholders represent one of the limitations of this body of literature. 
Another potential limitation is the perceived significance of some of the outcomes 
outlined in the literature.  The early-career earnings premium to student-athletes is a good 
example of this question of whether the finding is meaningful.  Although the premium is 
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statistically significant in the study, it is a relatively small difference (4%) between student-
athletes and non-athletes.  Observers may view this as a relatively unimportant finding.  
Similarly, conditional findings related to specific subgroups of student-athletes might not lead to 
a better overall understanding of the outcomes of intercollegiate athletics.  The fact that female 
and Black student-athletes have higher levels of self-concept compared to male and White 
student-athletes (Gaston Gayles & Hu, 2009) does not identify the general effect of 
intercollegiate athletics on all student-athletes.  These concerns about the importance of some of 
the relationsihps identified in the literature represent another limitation of this body of literature. 
The third potential limitation of these studies is related to the questions and topics that 
they leave unanswered.  Many of these involve the effects of intercollegiate athletics to the other 
stakeholders, like coaches and professional sports leagues.  There is good reason to believe that 
these stakeholders benefit greatly from their links to intercollegiate athletics, but the scholarly 
literature is sparse or nonexistent in these areas.  In other words, these interesting connections are 
neither validated nor contradicted in the literature, leaving observers to draw conclusions from 
limited information.   
Finally, causal relationships are also lacking in the current literature.  While, the 
researcher and observer alike desire to know the causal effects of athletics, the vast majority of 
the current literature is relational, and while they certainly provide evidence of relationship, 
making causal inferences from these studies is perilous.  Omitted variable bias is a difficult 
barrier to overcome, but Cellini (2008) describes quasi-experimental techniques that may be 
useful in addressing this barrier and allowing for causal inferences.  These techniques are gaining 
in popularity in the education literature and have even been used in at least one recent 
intercollegiate athletics study; Anderson (2012) used propensity score matching and instrument 
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variables in a study of intercollegiate athletics, which will be discussed in more depth in Essay 3.  
The empirical studies in Essay 2 and Essay 3 both employ quasi-experimental techniques. 
Overall, the limitations of this body of literature involve questions about the 
generalizability, significance, and completeness of some of the studies.  In addition, there are 
topical areas that are under-researched, including the effects on other stakeholders, like coaches 
and non-athlete students, and the financial connections between athletics activities and higher 
education institutions.  All of these limitations may be addressed in future research on the effects 
of athletics in higher education. 
Summary of Existing Literature 
 This literature review shows that intercollegiate athletics and higher education have a 
complex relationship.  The relationship is longstanding, but has been marked by tension and 
failed attempts to align their priorities.  The relationship is also marked by athletics’ strong 
financial dependency on their host institutions, which runs counter to the common perception 
that big-time intercollegiate athletics are self-sufficient.   
 Evidence from the literature suggests that several different stakeholders may experience 
outcomes from intercollegiate athletics in different ways.  Institutions may experience increases 
in donations from alumni and increases in applicants when their teams win.  Student-athletes 
may realize higher earnings, and varied academic and social outcomes from their participation in 
intercollegiate athletics.  Other stakeholders are less researched, but nevertheless there is 
evidence of some relationship between athletics and these other stakeholders.  For example, the 
findings for the relationship between local communities and athletics events are mixed.  Coaches 
and professional sports leagues might be the biggest beneficiaries of college sports, but the 
research is very sparse making it impossible to draw any meaningful conclusions.   
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 This literature review understandably leads an observer to ask: are intercollegiate 
athletics are worth the financial investment made by higher education institutions?  And if 
institutions are going to participate, what affects the size of the revenues that they are able to 
generate from these activities?  These questions are, of course, much too general to address 
directly, but the following two empirical studies are intended to provide insight into these types 
of questions.  Essay 2 specifically addresses institutional subsidies to athletics, seeking to 
analyze the effect of winning on the level of athletic subsidy.  The identification and utilization 
of instrumental variables in Essay 2 is a significant contribution to the existing literature.  Essay 
3 tests the effects of making the NCAA men’s basketball tournament on basketball-specific, total 
athletic, and institutional revenues using a regression discontinuity design.  This design is also a 
contribution to the existing literature.  Taken together, these two empirical studies address a gap 
in the literature and further the understanding of the financial relationship between intercollegiate 
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ESSAY 2 
THE EFFECTS OF ATHLETICS WINNING ON INSTITUTIONAL SUBSIDIES TO 
ATHLETICS 
Many higher education institutions participate in intercollegiate athletics.  Almost 
without exception, these participating institutions also choose to subsidize their athletic 
departments with institutional funds.  Subsidies are an interesting research topic because they 
provide insights into how institutions set and fund their priorities.  News articles (e.g., 
Berkowitz, Upton, & Brady, 2013) and even some research articles (e.g., Denhart & Vedder, 
2010) have framed athletic subsidies in a negative light.  However, athletic subsidies should not 
be viewed as necessarily inappropriate.  They are an interesting research topic because they may 
provide insight into institutional priorities and practices, but it is not the intention of this study to 
make any judgment about the normative value of athletic subsidies.   Deficits, which will be 
shown later, are not desirable, but they are not necessarily indicative of out of control finances.  
Likewise, institutional support for athletics may run counter to the conventional wisdom that 
athletics are self-supporting, but it is not necessarily indicative of misplaced priorities.  
Judgments on institutional priorities would require full context, and consideration of the myriad 
of outcomes associated with intercollegiate athletics, many of which were outlined in Essay 1.   
Higher education is no stranger to subsidization.  Winston (1999) details the “awkward 
economics” of higher education in which the cost of education is subsidized by an institution’s 
donative wealth.  A Delta Project report (2010) simplifies this concept and shows how the full 
cost of educating a student (at not-for-profit institutions) consists of two elements: the student’s 
share of tuition and the subsidy from state appropriations or an institutions donative wealth.  In 
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other words, the cost of higher education may be heavily subsidized from institutional revenues 
other than tuition. 
The Delta Project (2010) also details a different type of subsidization that is common in 
higher education.   
Cross-subsidization is endemic in higher education.  For instance, revenues generated 
from undergraduate students who enroll in low-cost disciplines such as humanities and 
social sciences, help pay for high-cost disciplines – fine arts, agriculture, law, and 
engineering, for example.  Similarly, lower division classes are less expensive than upper 
division classes…Since lower division students typically pay the same tuitions and fees 
as upper division students, the “excess” revenue from their tuitions helps underwrite the 
higher costs of upper division education. (p. 4) 
The report also points out that graduate education is typically subsidized by undergraduate 
education and that the use of tuition discounting and direct institutional financial aid is increasing 
(Delta Project, 2010).   
When considering the merits of subsidization, in general, the role that performance plays 
in subsidization decisions would seem critically important.  However, performance in most 
higher education contexts is difficult to measure accurately and uniformly across departments, 
colleges, or campuses.  Athletics, on the other hand, offer several readily accessible performance 
measures.  While a comprehensive measure of an institution’s overall athletics success may not 
be available, performance in individual sports can be measured by the wins and losses that the 
teams incur.  In addition to these standard metrics of success, sports statistics are available to 
provide additional context when needed.  This is why athletics offers a unique opportunity to 
study subsidization in higher education. 
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Besides providing insights into institutional funding priorities, athletic subsidies are also 
an interesting and timely research topic due to the attention that they have recently received in 
the popular press.  Much of this attention is likely due to the availability of data from the USA 
Today athletics finance database.  Some attention has even been given to the relationship 
between subsidies and other contemporary athletics issues, like conference realignments.  For 
example, Hinnen (2011) discusses the $12 million subsidy that Rutgers University provides to its 
athletic department and the tension that this causes with the faculty.  When it was announced that 
Rutgers would be joining the Big Ten conference, the expected increases in revenue resulting 
from the conference switch were cited as a primary benefit and were expected to eliminate the 
need for the institution’s large athletic subsidy (Staley, 2012; Weese, 2012).  This example 
illustrates that subsidies may impact a host of institutional behaviors and their effects may reach 
far beyond athletic enterprises. 
The size and mechanics of institutional subsidies vary across institutions.  This study 
attempts to add to the current understanding of how institutions fund intercollegiate athletics by 
addressing the following research question: What effect does athletic performance have on the 
levels of athletic subsidies?  A related, but separate, research question may ask about the effect 
on athletic performance of revenues, of which subsidies may be one source.  While this 
alternative question may be of specific interest to athletic directors, the present study focuses on 
understanding the institutional behavior represented by subsidies.  In this study, number of wins 
or winning percentage in men’s basketball and football will be used as a measure of athletic 
performance.  To answer the research question, panel regressions and an instrumental variables 
approach will be used.  Control variables for this analysis will be chosen based on a review of 
the relevant literature. 
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Review of the Literature 
It is helpful to begin with a definition.  In theory, athletic subsidies are simply 
institutional resources that have been directed to help fund athletics.  Because athletic 
departments also derive revenues from their own operations, the institutional resources can be 
viewed as “subsidizing” these activities.  These subsidies range from planned, direct budget 
transfers to covering the deficits generated by athletic departments.  This support highlights the 
strong financial relationship between institutions and their athletic departments.  The NCAA 
refers to subsidies as “allocated revenues,” which include student fees, direct institutional aid, 
indirect institutional support, and direct governmental aid (Fulks, 2012).  These revenue sources 
are distinct from revenues generated through athletic activities (e.g., ticket sales and media 
contracts).  Because of the institution’s discretion over these resources, they may be viewed as 
allocations to athletics instead of academic or other institutional initiatives and priorities.  The 
aggregation of these four revenue streams (i.e., student fees, direct institutional aid, indirect 
facilities and administrative support, and direct state aid) is a common operational definition of 
athletic subsidies (Denhart & Vedder, 2010; Lederman, 2010; Fulks 2012).  However, this study 
is interested only in the portion of the subsidy attributable to institutional funds and institutional 
decision makers.  Therefore, the operational definition for this study will exclude the direct state 
aid portion of athletic subsidies, capturing only student fees, direct institutional aid, and indirect 
facilities and administrative support.  While this definitional distinction is important for the 
interpretation of the results for this study, excluding direct state aid is not expected to have a 
major impact on the actual results since direct state aid is far less common than the other 
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Institutional subsidies to athletics represent a direct financial impact of athletics on higher 
education institutions.  Studies have shown that the flow of financial support typically moves 
from the university to the athletic department (Kahn, 2007), and data from this study’s sample 
confirms this finding.  The average amount of total institutional subsidies at FBS subdivision 
institutions (NCAA subdivisions are defined in more detail below in the methods section) in 
2012 was $9.9 million, with the highest subtotal at the Rutgers University ($28.0 million).  
Seven of the 102 FBS institutions in the sample provided no institutional subsidies to their 
athletic departments in 2012: Louisiana State University, Ohio State University, Penn State 
University, Purdue University, University of Nebraska, University of Oklahoma, and University 
of Texas.  At FCS institutions, the average institutional subsidy was $10.0 million in 2012, with 
the highest subtotal at James Madison University ($27.3 million).  At Other Division I 
institutions, the average subsidy was $8.8 million in 2012 and the highest amount was at the 
University of North Carolina at Charlotte ($18.3 million).  These institutional resources 
represented, on average, 17.3% of total athletic department revenues for FBS institutions, 68.9% 
for FCS institutions, and 78.0% at Other Division I institutions.  In addition, Kahn (2007) found 
that each of the NCAA’s Division I subdivisions produced net deficits when institutional 
subsidies were excluded.  These simple analyses seem to suggest that big-time college sports are 
not big-time financial contributors to their host institutions, which runs counter to the 
conventional wisdom.  The financials of big-time college sports participants reveal that only a 
                                                          
2
 Even this percentage is likely skewed upward.  Air Force and Army record 13 of the 14 largest values for direct 
state aid in the sample.  These institutions should receive no state support, only federal support, so this is likely a 
definitional inconsistency.  Because of missing values for covariates, these observations are not included in the 
testing sample for this study. 
  56 
 
handful of the largest programs do not rely on institutional support for at least a portion of their 
budgets. 
 Denhart and Vedder (2010) examined athletic subsidies in more detail.  They analyzed 
the relationship between various institutional characteristics and athletic subsidies and found that 
lower enrollments, lower institutional wealth, and higher percentages of Pell-eligible students 
were associated with higher athletic subsidies (Denhart & Vedder, 2010).  Equating athletic 
subsidies to a tax on institutional revenues and students, they claimed that their findings suggest 
that athletic subsidies are a regressive tax, disproportionately burdening poor institutions and 
students that can least afford to pay.  While informative for the present study, Denhart and 
Vedder’s work considers cross-institution differences, but does not attempt to explain why these 
differences exist or to make causal inferences.  This study, on the other hand, focuses on the role 
that performance plays in subsidy decisions within institutions and gets closer to determining 
causal relationships through the use of a two-way fixed effects panel model and an instrumental 
variables analysis.   
There are critics of using the existence of athletic subsidies as proof that an overall 
economic benefit for institutions does not exist.  Goff (2000), for example, claims that 
accounting practices mask the true economic impact of athletics on institutions.  He claims that 
athletic revenues are often attributed to non-athletic accounts and grants-in-aid are valued at list 
price rather than incremental cost to the institution.  Subsidies, then, could be viewed as means to 
reverse the effects of these accounting practices that understate athletic department revenues and 
overstate athletic expenses.  Goff believes that athletics are net financial contributors to higher 
education institutions after these types of adjustments are made, although he considers 
institutional subsidies as athletically generated revenues.   
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The literature shows that a strong financial connection exists between intercollegiate 
athletics and their higher education institutions.  The present study seeks to add to the 
understanding of factors that shape this financial relationship.  Despite some counter examples, 
most of the evidence points to a flow of financial resources from institutions to their athletic 
enterprises.  However, there may be nonfinancial benefits to the institution or to student-athletes 
that justify the subsidies to athletics.  A more comprehensive review of the literature related to 
the varied impacts of athletics on institutions, student-athletes, and other stakeholders is 
presented in the first essay of this volume.   
Theoretical Framework 
 Rational choice theory and the closely related game theory can be used to help predict 
what factors might impact the size of the institutional subsidy given to athletics.  Rational choice 
theory basically states that decision makers will attempt to optimize their expected utility.  This 
theory is focused on the decision maker.  In the case of subsidies, the decision makers are the 
individuals that are responsible for an institution’s allocations to athletic departments.  These 
may include presidents, chancellors, or governing boards. The decision-making authority may 
rest with different individuals at different institutions.  Athletics is one of many priorities that 
these decision makers have to balance, and they are likely attempting to optimize their athletic 
departments to a certain size and scope that may vary across institutions. It should be noted that 
the athletic director would not be the decision maker of interest.  While athletic directors play a 
clear role, they would not be primarily responsible for the allocation of institutional resources to 
athletics.  
 The foundation of rational choice theory and game theory could be considered to be 
Blaise Pascal’s work on expected value from the 17th century.  Expected value is defined as the 
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sum of the possible outcomes multiplied by their probability of occurring.  Pascal used this 
concept in his famous wager in the context of a discussion of the proper response to the prospect 
of eternal life (Pascal, trans. 1995).  Expected value may also be called expected utility when 
referring to a decision making process.  The expected utility for each alternative decision can be 
described as the sum of the utility/benefit of outcomes multiplied by the probability of each 
outcome.  Rational choice theory posits that decision makers select the alternative that optimizes 
their expected utility. 
 While rational choice theory is the predominant theory within neo-classical economics 
today, it is not without its critics.  Some of these critiques may be relevant to the application of 
the theory to the decision to subsidize intercollegiate athletics.  The most basic critique of 
rational choice theory is that its assumption of complete and perfect information in the decision 
making process is impossible.  Simon (1955, 1972) has pointed out that the decision maker’s 
ability to optimize his expected utility is bounded by the information that he has, as well as his 
ability to process the information.  Under bounded rationality, decision makers are still 
attempting to optimize their utility, but they are dealing with incomplete or imperfect 
information.  The result is that they will choose the alternative that they believe is optimal, even 
if it is not. 
 Bounded rationality provides a model for understanding how higher education decision 
makers might choose to subsidize intercollegiate athletics.  While the outcomes of athletics 
contests are easily measured as wins or losses, the effects of athletics on institutions are not 
always easily identifiable.  As evidenced from the literature, some of the potential benefits of 
athletics are noneconomic or difficult to quantify, like the academic benefits to student-athletes 
and any advertising effect that institutions may experience as a result of their athletics programs.  
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In other words, it is impossible to assign a dollar amount to these benefits with complete 
accuracy.  As a result, higher education decision makers are necessarily acting on imperfect 
information when they make decisions on the subsidies provided to athletics.  Nevertheless, 
these decision makers can be expected to attempt to maximize utility. 
Based on the assumption that they are seeking to maximize utility, it is possible to build a 
model of factors that might be expected to impact the size of the subsidy provided to athletics at 
an institution.  The dependent variable for such a model is the level of the subsidy provided to 
athletics.  In order to answer the research question and assess the impact of winning on subsidies, 
the independent variable of interest is a measure of athletics success.  My hypothesis that 
winning has a positive effect on institutional subsidies is discussed in more detail below.  Control 
variables include ticket sales revenue, total institutional operating revenues, student full-time 
equivalent (FTE) enrollments, and the number of sponsored sports as factors that potentially 
impact higher education leaders’ decisions regarding subsidies to athletics.  Insights from the 
literature review informed the selection of these variables and the hypothesized direction of their 
relationships with the level of subsidies provided to athletics.  Each of these variables is 
discussed in turn below. 
 The independent variable of interest – athletic department success – is somewhat difficult 
to quantify, but this study uses number of football or men’s basketball wins as proxies.  These 
two sports are the key revenue generators for Division I athletic programs.  The literature 
suggests that many of the institutional benefits to athletics are contingent upon success and 
winning in these sports, like the advertising effect (Toma & Cross, 1998; McCormick & Tinsley, 
1987; Mixon, 1995) and any fundraising benefits (Baade and Sundberg, 1996; Grimes and 
Chressanthis, 1994; Humphreys and Mondello, 2007; Sigelman and Bookheimer, 1983).  While 
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these benefits can be difficult to quantify, they would seem to be desirable for decision makers.  
As such, institutional leaders may reward these outcomes by making additional allocations to 
athletics.  For this reason, I expect measures of men’s basketball and football wins to have a 
positive effect on the size of the institutional subsidy. 
Ticket sales revenue serves as a proxy for the ability of an athletic department to generate 
independent revenues.  I expect decision makers to view more athletic revenues as a signal that 
the athletic department needs fewer institutional resources.  Decision makers, then, may derive 
more utility from allocating resources to other institutional priorities instead of athletics.  In other 
words, I expect subsidies to decline as athletic departments are able to generate revenues from 
sources outside the university, like ticket sales.  An alternative hypothesis might be that decision 
makers will attempt to amplify athletic revenues by investing even more institutional resources.  
This would make sense if institutional decision makers expect to produce $3 in athletic revenue 
for every $1 in institutional subsidy, for example.  However, because athletics is only one of 
many priorities that institutional decision makers balance, the expectation for this study is that 
institutional decision makers will decrease subsidies as ticket sales increase so that they can 
allocate those resources to other institutional priorities.   
Total institutional operating revenues are one measure of institutional size.  It can be 
considered a measure of the resources that institutional decision makers have to allocate to their 
priorities.  All things being equal, one would expect all campus units, including athletics, to 
benefit from larger operating revenues since decision makers have more resources to allocate.  I 
expect an institution’s total operating revenues to have a positive relationship with the size of the 
athletic subsidy.   
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FTE enrollments can also be viewed as a measure of institutional size as well, and larger 
student bodies represent potentially larger numbers of constituents interested in athletics.  These 
constituents/fans may exert influence on decision makers to allocate resources to athletics.  This 
rationale is consistent with Humphreys (2006), who discussed the possibility that fan bases exert 
influence on state legislatures when determining state appropriations to higher education 
institutions.  The literature review also alludes to potential positive effects of athletics on non-
athlete students (Mixon & Trevino, 2005).  Larger enrollments would mean that more students 
enjoy these benefits.  If decision makers believe that their subsidy decisions impact the benefits 
to students, they may feel compelled to increase athletic subsidies as enrollments increase.  
Enrollments are also a proxy for fee-paying students on campus.  Since athletics fees are a 
common component of institutional subsidies, total subsidies may rise – depending on the per 
student fee amount – as enrollments increase at institutions that have athletic fees.  For these 
reasons, I expect FTE enrollments to have a positive effect on the size of the subsidy.   
The number of sports sponsored at an institution provides insight into the 
administration’s perception about the proper scope of the athletic department.  Administrators 
may use subsidies to optimize or maintain the scope of the athletic department at the desired 
level.  Fielding more sports requires additional resources to cover the additional expenses, 
potentially creating a greater need for institutional subsidies.  For this reason, it is expected that 
subsidies are positively related with the number of sponsored sports. 
Data and Methods 
This analysis uses a panel dataset constructed from five primary sources: the USA Today 
Athletics Finance Database, Jeff Sagarin’s Ratings (published by the USA Today), the U.S. 
Department of Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) and 
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Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act (EADA) databases, and the NCAA.  In addition to these 
primary sources, consumer price index (CPI) data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics was 
also used.   
The athletics finance data was obtained from USA Today.  USA Today has compiled an 
athletics finance database by submitting Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to 
institutions requesting their financial submissions to the NCAA.  (An example of an institution’s 
submission to the NCAA that was obtained from the USA Today is included in Appendix A.)  
Only public institutions are required to respond to these FOIA requests, so the sample is limited 
to these institutions.  The NCAA has more comprehensive data that would include all of their 
member institutions, but they are not willing to share this data for research purposes.
3
  As such, 
the USA Today dataset represents the best available data related to athletics finance.  These are 
self-reported, unaudited financial data, so definitions and accounting practices may vary 
somewhat across institutions.    
The USA Today data only includes institutions in the NCAA’s Division I.  When 
considering football data – like number of wins – the analysis will be further limited to 
institutions that participate in football and belong to the Football Bowl Series (FBS) or Football 
Championship Series (FCS) subdivisions.  The FBS subdivision is the NCAA’s most prestigious 
division and was formerly known as Division I-A.  The FCS division was formerly known as 
Division I-AA.  Both of these subdivisions require participation in football.  The distinction 
between the two is in their postseason football formats, with the FBS teams participating in bowl 
games and FCS teams participating in a playoff system.
4
  Because of this difference and the 
resulting difference in possible number of games played, the football subdivisions will be 
                                                          
3
 I contacted the NCAA’s Director of Research in the spring of 2012 and was informed that the association’s 
membership agreement does not allow for the release of the financial data that the NCAA collects. 
4
 The FBS will host bowl games and a limited playoff system beginning in 2014. 
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analyzed separately when using the wins variable and jointly by substituting winning percentage 
as the independent variable of interest.  Division I also has a small number of institutions that do 
not participate in football.  Collectively, these subdivisions (FBS, FCS, and Division I non-
football institutions) are what most observers would consider big-time college sports.  There are 
no subdivisions for Division I NCAA basketball, and all institutions are eligible for the same 68-
team postseason tournament.  However, the six largest athletic conferences (ACC, Big East, Big 
Ten, Big 12, Pac-12, and SEC), referred to as the BCS (Bowl Championship Series) 
conferences
5
, are typically overrepresented in the postseason tournament.  Given this reality, 
separate analyses for BCS conference institutions and non-BCS conference institutions will be 
run, in addition to the full model, to assess any differences across these subgroups.   
A unique, panel dataset spanning the year 2005-2012 was constructed for this study.  
2005 is the first year of data available in the USA Today Athletics Finance database.  2012 is the 
most recent year with data available for all of the measures used in this study.  The USA Today 
database includes several variables, but the components that comprise institutional subsidies (i.e., 
student fees, direct institutional support, and indirect facilities and administrative support) are of 
particular interest to this study.  Ticket sales revenues were also obtained from the USA Today 
Athletics Finance Database.  The sport count variable was derived from participant data available 
in the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act database.  Athletics outcomes measures (e.g., number 
of wins for basketball and football) were collected from the NCAA.  The final two data elements 
in the model, FTE enrollments and institutional revenues, were obtained from the Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), which is maintained by the U.S. Department of 
Education.  Points per game and strength of schedule variables, which will be used in the 
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The BCS conference distinction is related to football since these conferences have secured automatic bids to the 
BCS bowl games; however, the term is used in this study to simply designate the six largest athletic conferences. 
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instrumental variables approach, were obtained from the NCAA and Jeff Sagarin’s published 
ratings, respectively.  All of these data elements were merged by IPEDS institution codes to 
produce the final data set.  Table 2.1 shows the variable list and the corresponding sources.   
This analysis employs two-way fixed effects models with a panel dataset.  The dependent 
variable for all of the primary models is the institutional subsidy provided to athletics in the 
following year.  This represents the total of direct institutional aid, indirect facilities and 
administrative support, and student fees from the USA Today database.  It is necessary to use a 
lead value for subsidies since portions of the subsidy may be determined before the academic 
year.  Student fees, for example, are most likely determined before the start of the academic year, 
which would precede any effect of athletic success, which is the focus of the research question.  
Current year results, on the other hand, would be expected to influence next year’s budget 
allocation decisions.  Since universities’ fiscal years typically follow the traditional academic 
calendar with a start during the summer months (e.g., July 1), the previous season’s results 
would be the most recent available measure of athletic success when budgets are approved.  
Goldstein (2005) describes the college and university budgeting cycle as an iterative process, but 
he places next year’s budget approval in the May to June timeframe, which would put it shortly 
after the conclusion of the current year’s basketball season.    
The independent variable of interest is a measure of athletics success, which is being 
measured by winning in the two highest profile sports: men’s basketball and football.  The 
National Association of Collegiate Directors of Athletics publishes an annual ranking of athletic 
departments (called the Directors’ Cup), which was considered as possibly a more 
comprehensive measure of athletics success.  However, not all sports are necessarily scored for 
each institution and different sports are scored differently based on the postseason format.  For 
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example, a championship in men’s basketball or men’s water polo is worth 100 points, but a 
second place finish in these sports is worth 90 and 70 points, respectively.  Furthermore, not all 
Division I institutions are ranked each year, creating missing data.  These limitations present 
challenges in using the Directors’ Cup ratings and rankings in research studies like this one.  In 
the absence of reliable comprehensive measure, basketball or football wins (or winning 
percentage) will serve as measures of athletics success.   
All of the models include the same set of control variables previously discussed as 
potentially impacting the level of the institutional subsidy for athletics: number of sponsored 
NCAA sports, enrollment, total institutional revenue, and ticket sales.  Subsequent analyses will 
include the number of football wins and will be limited to the FBS and FCS subsets of the data.  
Year and institution fixed effects are also included in these models.  Panel ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimates are generated for the coefficients for each of the independent variables.  The 
panel data requires special treatment in the regression analysis.  I include dummy variables for 
each of the years and fixed effects for the institutions in the dataset. This controls for the natural 
correlation that exists in a single institution’s data across years and essentially generate year and 
institution fixed effects. The year fixed effect controls for common time trends and the institution 
fixed effect control for unobserved heterogeneity.  The general model can be described in the 
following equation: 
Yi(t+1) = βWit + γXit + αi + λt + Ɛit      (2.1) 
Where Yi(t+1) is the amount of the total subsidy at institution, i, in year, t +1; Wit is a measure of 
athletics wins (e.g., football or men’s basketball); β is the coefficient for the success variable in 
the model; Xit is a matrix of control variables; γ is scalar of regression coefficients; αi is the 
institution effect; λt is the year effect; and Ɛit is the error term.   
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 Several models are run from the general equation.  Basketball and football success are 
considered separately, as well as in a combined model.  When football wins are used in a model 
with all institutions, winning percentage will need to be used in the place of number of wins.  
This is necessary because of different postseason formats and the resulting differences in the 
total possible games played by teams from each subdivision.
6
   
 In addition to the two-way fixed effect models, an instrumental variable approach is also 
employed.  The two-way fixed effect model assumes that institutional subsidies are determined 
by the explanatory variables but do not drive changes to the explanatory variables themselves.  In 
reality, the relationship between subsidies and the independent variables may be more complex.  
For example, the two-way fixed effects model assumes that institutional leaders weigh all other 
information to make the ultimate decision on the level of subsidy to provide to athletics.  This 
ignores the possibility that subsidies are used as criteria for other decisions.  If institutional 
leaders are ultimately trying to optimize the scope of their athletics enterprises with an 
appropriate revenue base, then institutional subsidies are one of many revenue levers for which 
they may make decisions.  If changes to subsidies are believed to drive changes in any of the 
independent variables, specifically the success variable, in the two-way fixed effects model, then 
the loop of causality presents an endogeneity issue.   
 One way to address the endogeneity issue is through an instrumental variables approach.  
While instrumental variables can be difficult to find, they have been used in higher education 
research.  Cellini (2008) discusses instrumental variables as one of the strategies to dealing with 
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 Exploratory models were also run with the individual components of subsidies (i.e., student fees, direct 
institutional aid, and indirect facilities and administrative support) used as dependent variables.  No consistent, 
significant results were found for these exploratory models.  This is not necessarily surprising given that institutions 
likely use the different components differently, and in some cases, may simply label the institutional subsidy 
differently.  While 97% of the sample reported an overall institutional subsidy to athletics in 2012, only 62% 
reported providing indirect facilities and administrative support. 
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endogeneity in the higher education literature.  Likewise, instrumental variables have been used 
in studies of several higher education topics, including tuition (Hoxby, 1997), research output 
(Payne, 2002; Payne & Siow, 2003), higher education and economic growth (Aghion, Boustan, 
Hoxby, & Vandenbussche, 2009), and federal earmarks to higher education (Delaney, 2013).  
There is at least one example of an instrumental variables approach being used in the study of 
college athletics.  Anderson (2012) used propensity score matching and instrumental variables to 
analyze the effects of athletics success on academic outcomes and donations. 
To implemental this approach, one or more instrumental variables are needed that are 
correlated with the endogenous independent variable of interest, but uncorrelated with 
unobserved factors.  Strength of schedule (SOS) and points per game (PPG) were chosen as 
instrumental variables.  In order to be valid instruments, SOS and PPG need to be predictive of 
winning and only related to subsidies through winning.  SOS is a measure of a team’s opponents’ 
quality, which should be predictive of the team’s success (wins) against those opponents.  All 
other things being equal, I would expect that a weaker strength of schedule would result in more 
wins, for example.  Likewise, PPG is a measure of a team’s offensive production and I would 
expect that the ability to score points would be predictive of winning.  At the same time, there is 
no clear relationship between these two instruments (SOS and PPG) and the dependent variable 
(institutional subsidies) except through the success variable.  In fact, these two statistics do not 
receive much attention outside of sports circles and there is no evidence that college 
administrators use them in any decision making.  Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine how 
these two variables could be related to subsidies except through winning.  Points per game are 
somewhat random and no systematic differences are evident across any baseline characteristics 
(e.g., teams from northern states are not known to score more or less than teams from southern 
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states).   Since SOS is, in part, affected by an institution’s conference affiliation (teams play a 
large number of games against conference opponents), perhaps SOS could be related to subsidies 
through conference affiliation.  Even if this was the case, conference effects may be expected to 
be conditioned out by other covariates in the model, like ticket sales and number of sponsored 
sports, for example.  In other words, SOS and PPG are believed to represent valid instruments 
because they are only related to institutional subsidies through the measure of wins.
7
   
Fortunately, because the instrumental variables models in this study all utilize more than 
one instrumental variable predicting one endogenous variable, I can test overidentification 
restrictions, which are the number of extra instrumental variables.  The Sargan test, sometimes 
also referred to as the Hansen test or Sargan-Hansen test, effectively tests whether one or more 
instrumental variables are correlated with the error, violating the assumption.  The Sargan 
statistics are presented in the results tables.  The null hypothesis is that the instrumental variables 
are uncorrelated with the error term, so rejection of the null, signified by significance in the 
Sargan statistic, would suggest that at least one of the instruments is correlated with the error 
term and provide evidence of bias. 
 In addition to being valid instruments, the instruments need to be relevant.  “Weak” 
instruments can produce biased estimates, even if they are valid.  Staiger and Stock (1997) 
proposed a simple test for weak instruments.  Their rule of thumb stated that weak instruments 
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 Appendix B presents a correlation table for the four instrumental variables and the first-stage regression results.  
These tables provide evidence that these instrumental variables are generally not highly correlated and, thus, 
contribute uniquely to the models.  The basketball and football strength of schedule variables do show high 
correlation in Table B1, which likely explains why only one of these two variables is significant in the first-stage 
regression models in Table B4, when a composite measure of football and men’s basketball winning percentage is 
being analyzed.  The other instrumental variables in these models – basketball and football points per game – are 
both consistently significant.  As a robustness check, the combined winning percentage models were run with only 
three instrumental variables, excluding one of the SOS instrumental variables, and the results did not change 
significantly from those shown in Table 2.12.  
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result in a first stage F statistic of less than 10.  The first stage F statistic essentially tests whether 
the instruments are relevant to the first stage regression.  Cragg and Donald (1993) developed a 
test for weak instruments that is particularly useful when there is more than one endogenous 
regressor.  Stock and Yogo (2005) contributed critical values for the Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic to test whether a given group of instruments is weak or strong.  Both the first stage F 
statistic rule of thumb and the Cragg-Donald test are used in the instrumental variables approach 
to determine the strength of the instruments. 
 The instrumental variables approach will be implemented as a two-stage least squares 
regression.  The first stage will predict the number of wins or winning percentage, Wit, as a 
function the instruments of SOS and PPG, vector Z, and a vector of other independent variables, 
Xit.  Xit includes the same set of variables as equation 2.1.  In addition, the first stage model 
includes a constant, δ0, and an error term, ƐW.   The first stage is represented in equation 2.2: 
Wit = δ0 + δ1Zit + Xit + ƐW      (2.2) 
The second stage, then, uses the predicted value of Wit to predict the level of institutional 
subsidy: 
Yi(t+1) = β(Zit’Wit) + γXit + αi + λt + ƐY    (2.3) 
Where Yi(t+1) is the amount of the total subsidy at institution, i, in year, t + 1; α is the 
institution effect; λt is the year effect; Wit is the predicted value for the measure of wins; β is the 
coefficient of interest, Xit is a matrix of independent variables; γ is scalar of regression 
coefficients; and ƐY is the error term.  
Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the panel regressions and 
instrumental variables approach.
8
  After accounting for missing values, there are a total of 1,492 
                                                          
8
 The descriptive statistics in Table 2.2 are for the estimating sample; because the outcome variable in the estimating 
sample is total subsidy for year, t + 1, the descriptive statistics do not include the total subsidy in year, t. 
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observations across 227 institutions.  When the sample is restricted to only football-participating 
institutions, there are 1,183 observations across 179 institutions.   
The average CPI-adjusted athletic subsidy was $8.7 million, with a range of $0 to $29.1 
million.  Ten institutions reported no subsidies for at least one year of the dataset: Louisiana 
State University (LSU), Ohio State University, Pennsylvania State University, Purdue 
University, Texas A&M University, University of Nebraska, University of Oklahoma, University 
of Oregon, University of Texas, and Youngstown State University.  Three of these institutions 
reported no subsidies in each of the seven years: LSU, Nebraska, and Ohio State.  The largest 
single-year, CPI-adjusted subsidy was reported by the University of Delaware in 2011 ($29.1 
million).   
Descriptive statistics for the independent variables of interest are also presented in Table 
2.2.  The number of basketball wins averaged 16.5 in the sample, and ranged from 2 (5 
institutions) to 38 (Kentucky in 2012 and Memphis in 2008).  The number of football wins 
averaged 6.1, and ranged from 0 (19 institutions) to 14 (6 institutions).
9
  The average combined 
winning percentage for basketball and football was 51.7%, and ranged from 4.9% (Savannah 
State University in 2006) to 92.5% (University of Kansas in 2008).   
Tables 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 present descriptive statistics for the subgroups that are used 
in analyses: BCS-only institutions, non-BCS institutions, FBS institutions, and FCS institutions 
respectively.  By comparing the descriptive statistics for these subgroups, one can see that there 
are significant differences across these groups in terms of institutional size (measured by average 
enrollments and average institutional revenue) and scope of athletics enterprise (measured by the 
number of sponsored sports and average ticket sales revenue).  The differences in the average 
                                                          
9
 The original sample included a football points per game value of 403 for Morgan State University in 2005.  This is 
an obvious error and was treated as a missing value in the analyses.  
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subsidy are less obvious.  While the BCS-only group has a lower average subsidy than the non-
BCS group ($5.7 million vs $9.7 million), the average subsidies in the FBS and FCS groups are 
very similar, $8.8 million and $8.9 million, respectively.  Understanding differences across these 
subgroups may help explain the findings. 
Results 
 The results for this analysis are presented in the following three sections.  The first 
section focuses on the models analyzing the effects of basketball success, while the second 
section focuses on football success.  The third section considers both basketball and football 
success simultaneously by using a composite measure of success.  Each of these sections 
includes discussion of the results of both panel analyses and instrumental variables analyses.     
Basketball Success and Athletic Subsidies 
Table 2.7 shows panel regression results for basketball-only models, and the dependent 
variable is a lead value of subsidies, or the subsidy the year following the predictor variables.  
While it is possible that current year performance could impact current year subsidies, especially 
in the case of indirect institutional support, it is more likely that current year performance will 
impact next year’s subsidy decisions.  Furthermore, using a lead value of subsidy eliminates the 
possibility of finding an effect that precedes the treatment.   
Column 1 of Table 2.7 shows the results of the model when run with all institutions in the 
sample.  In this model, the number of basketball wins does not have a significant relationship 
with the level of subsidy.  However, Column 2 shows the results when the sample is limited to 
BCS conference basketball programs.  For these “big-time” basketball institutions, the 
coefficient for basketball wins is statistically significant.  The magnitude of effect implies that 
each additional win is associated with an increase of $32,373, or 0.37% of the average subsidy 
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across all years, in institutional support for athletics.  Column 3 shows the results for non-BCS 
conference basketball programs.  Basketball wins is not significantly related to subsidies for 
these institutions. 
The results for the control variables across the different models presented in Table 2.7 
provide an interesting finding.  It appears that the controls have different relationships with 
subsidies across BCS conference and non-BCS conference institutions.  Some of these 
differences are consistent throughout many of the results tables.  For example, ticket sales 
consistently have a significant negative relationship with subsidies for BCS conference 
institutions, but no significant relationship for non-BCS conference institutions.  Conversely, 
enrollments appear to have a more consistent, significant relationship with subsidies for non-
BCS conference institutions than for BCS conference institutions.  These differences may be, in 
part, explained by the differences highlighted in the descriptive statistics for these subgroups.  
The large differences in average ticket sales revenue, for example, provide evidence that BCS 
institutions rely on ticket sales more than non-BCS institutions.  It seems reasonable, then, to 
expect ticket sales to be more predictive of subsidy decisions at BCS institutions than non-BCS 
institutions.  Generally speaking, this may suggest that the primary drivers of subsidy decisions 
are different at institutions from the two groups.   
Table 2.8 displays the results of the instrumental variables approach with the independent 
variable of interest still being basketball wins.  In each of these models, two instrumental 
variables are used: basketball strength-of-schedule and basketball points per game.  Basketball 
wins have a significant, positive effect in the full model that includes all institutions (p<0.05) and 
the BCS-only model (p<0.01).  No significant effect is found for the non-BCS model.  The 
magnitude of effect for the full model suggests that each additional basketball win is associated 
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with an increase in subsidy of $38,083, or 0.44%.  This is similar to the effect size found in the 
panel regression analysis for BCS-only institutions.  The magnitude of effect in the IV BCS-only 
model, however, is much larger, indicating that each additional basketball win is associated with 
an increase of $104,163, or 1.19% on average, in subsidy.  The Sargan statistic in each model is 
not significant, meaning that the null of the instruments being uncorrelated with the error term is 
not rejected.  The first stage F statistics for each of the basketball models in Table 2.8 are much 
greater than ten, and the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics are all greater than the Stock and Yogo 
critical values.  These results suggest that the instruments for the number of basketball wins are 
valid and not weak. 
Football Success and Athletic Subsidies 
Football success is also commonly used in the literature as a proxy for athletics success.  
Table 2.9 presents the results of the same panel regression model as Table 2.7, but with measures 
of football success replacing the measures of basketball success.  Because teams from the two 
NCAA Division I football subdivisions potentially play different numbers of games, football 
winning percentage is used as the independent variable of interest in the full model (column 1).  
When the FBS and FCS subdivisions are considered separately (Columns 2 and 3), the absolute 
number of football wins is an acceptable independent variable, and is preferred since analysis of 
wins is more intuitive than winning percentage.  It should be noted that the full model using 
football variables does not include the same institutions as the full model when using basketball 
variables since not all NCAA Division I institutions participate in football.  Table 2.9 shows that 
the football independent variable was not statistically related to subsidies in any of the models.  
This is somewhat contradictory to the basketball results, where there was some evidence of a 
positive effect of winning on subsidy levels. 
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The instrumental variables approach was also employed with the football models.  Here, 
both football strength-of-schedule and football points per game serve as instruments for the 
measures of football success (i.e., football winning percentage or number football wins).  The 
results for these analyses are presented in Table 2.10.  In the full, FBS, and FCS models, the 
measure of football success is not found to have a significant effect on the level of athletic 
subsidy.  Again, this contradicts the basketball results and suggests that subsidy decisions may be 
impacted differently by different types of athletic success.  Even though no significant effect was 
found, the first stage F statistics were much greater than ten for all three models and the Cragg-
Donald Wald F statistics were greater than the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values.  
Furthermore, the Sargan statistics were not significant.  This suggests that, despite not finding 
significant results, the football instruments were still valid and strong. 
Basketball and Football Models 
Table 2.11 shows the results of the panel regression model when the independent variable 
is a composite measure of basketball and football winning percentage (i.e., basketball wins + 
football wins / total number of basketball and football games played).  The rationale behind the 
joint model is that perhaps institutional leaders factor in performance in both sports when 
considering subsidy decisions.  All Division I programs participate in basketball, but not all 
participate in football; therefore the sample for this joint analysis is limited to institutions 
participating in football, similar to Tables 2.9 and 2.10.   
In the full model (Column 1), no significant relationship is found between combined 
basketball and football winning percentage and subsidies.  Similarly, no significant relation is 
found when the model is run on the subgroups of football subdivision, FBS (Column 2) and FCS 
(Column 3).  However, when disaggregating the sample into the BCS-only (Column 4) and non-
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BCS (Column 5) groups that were used in the basketball analyses, a positive, significant effect 
(p<0.1) is found for combined winning percentage, but only for the BCS-only model.  This 
aligns with the basketball-only results (Table 2.7), which may have been expected given the 
similarities of the samples.  In fact, the samples are identical.  A small number of institutions in 
the BCS conferences do not participate in football; however, since the data does not include any 
of these institutions, restricting to BCS-only institutions results in identical samples for the 
football and basketball analyses.  The magnitude of the effect for BCS institutions suggests that 
each percentage increase in combined winning percentage is associated with an $18,128, or 
0.31% on average, increase in subsidies.  A back of the envelope calculation can be used to 
convert this into terms of the effect per additional win.  Assuming that the total number of 
basketball and football games is around 50 games, each additional win changes the winning 
percentage by 2%.  So the change in subsidy for each percentage increase in winning percentage 
can roughly be doubled to estimate the change in subsidy for each additional win.  Here, this 
suggests that each additional basketball or football game is associated with approximately $36, 
000, which is in line with the basketball-only result (Table 2.7). 
Table 2.12 displays the results for the instrumental variables approach using the 
composite winning percentage variable.  All four instrumental variables – basketball PPG, 
basketball SOS, football PPG, and football SOS – were used.  A positive, significant effect was 
found for the full (p<0.01), FBS (p<0.05), FCS (p<0.1), BCS (p<0.01), and non-BCS (p<0.1) 
models.  The magnitude of effects ranged from $18,397 to $47,491, or 0.19% to 0.82% on 
average, increase in subsidy for every 1% increase in combined winning percentage.  Conducting 
a back of the envelope estimation again and assuming approximately 50 total games, these 
results suggest an approximate $40,000 to $95,000 increase in subsidy for each additional 
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basketball or football win.  In each of these models, the first-stage F statistics is much greater 
than ten; the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics are all greater than Stock and Yogo (2005) critical 
values; and the Sargan statistics are not significant, providing further evidence of the 
instrumental variables being both valid and strong. 
Discussion of Results and Limitations 
 There are several takeaways from the results of the various models.  The most basic 
finding is that there is some evidence that performance affects institutional subsidies to athletics, 
and in all cases, this evidence points to a positive effect.  I only found evidence of basketball 
success and basketball and football composite success impacting subsidy decisions.  No evidence 
was found of football success individually influencing subsidy decisions.  This is somewhat 
surprising and there is no clear explanation as to why institutional leaders would consider one 
sport’s success over the other.  The sports are played in different seasons and perhaps the timing 
of subsidy decisions coincides with basketball season at many institutions.  It may also be a 
result of truly differential effects across the two sports.  Curs, Harper, and Frey (2012) failed to 
find any evidence of an effect of football success, measured by bowl game participation, on 
academic success, athletic revenues, applications, or enrollments, so perhaps football success is 
simply less impactful on some outcomes than basketball success. 
The strongest and most consistent effect of basketball success was found at institutions 
participating in big-time (BCS conference) college athletics.  Based on the differences in size 
and scope highlighted in the descriptive statistics, it was not surprising to find different results 
across subgroups of institutions.  Athletics likely play very different roles within institutions 
from these subgroups.  The strength and consistency of the findings for big-time college athletics 
may also be explained by the high visibility of sports at these institutions; information and 
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feedback on the team’s success is likely more readily available at these institutions.  This may 
provide insight into how performance may affect different types of higher education subsidies 
where feedback and data is even more obscure. 
This study adds to the understanding of the relationship between athletics and their higher 
education institutions, specifically the financial relationship.  Just as previous literature has 
suggested that athletics success may impact an institution’s applications, student profile, and 
fundraising efforts, the results from this study provide evidence that athletics success may also 
influence institutional budgeting decisions.  This study also adds to the emerging body of 
literature that specifically looks at athletic subsidies and offers a unique contribution in its use of 
quasi-experimental research methods.  One contribution of this study is the identification and 
successful implementation of instrumental variables in the study of the effects of athletics 
success.  These particular instruments, which were argued to satisfy the necessary criteria for 
valid instruments, and were shown to be consistently strong and pass overidentification tests in 
this study, may prove beneficial in future studies.  This study also contributes to the 
understanding of subsidization in higher education in general.  As such, this research may have 
implications for institutional leaders, athletic directors, reformers, and other researchers. 
There are some limitations to this study.  The dataset is the source of at least two possible 
limitations.  The dataset is restricted to public institutions since these are the only institutions 
required to respond to the USA Today FOIA requests.  As a result, one of the limitations of this 
study is that the results cannot be generalized to private institutions.  In addition, the study 
focuses exclusively on Division I institutions.  The significant differences between NCAA 
divisions preclude any generalizations to Division II or Division III athletics from this study’s 
findings. 
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Data quality may represent another limitation of the study.  The financial data is 
unaudited and self-reported by the institutions.  It may be the case that certain expenditures, like 
indirect facilities and maintenance support, are not accounted for uniformly across the sample.  
This would introduce bias into the sample, and it is not possible to estimate whether the potential 
bias would tend to skew results in a particular direction.  However, for this type of financial data, 
the USA Today database used in this study represents the best data available at this time. 
 Despite these limitations, this study makes a unique contribution to the literature and 
provides useful insights into the research question.  Athletics success appears to have a positive 
effect on subsidy levels, but this effect may vary by sport and by institutional type.  There is still 
plenty of research potential on the topic of institutional subsidies to athletics.  This study was 
limited by the available data, but it would certainly be worthwhile to conduct a similar study 
with the full sample of NCAA Division I institutions, not just public institutions, if this data can 
be obtained from the NCAA.  Considering some of the recent changes and ongoing debates in 
college athletics (e.g., television networks, conference realignments, paying athletes), future 
studies may also consider the effects that these changes have on the subsidies.  Subsidies, for 
example, may be particularly important to the debate of paying athletes as institutional leaders 
may assume that increasing costs will require higher levels of subsidies.  An analysis of the 
different types of subsidies is another logical extension of this study.  For the reasons mentioned 
previously, this analysis may require different methods.  Perhaps a longitudinal study at select 
institutions would be most appropriate to determine how these individual components are 
affected by athletics success.  Ideally, this study could also inform future research on different 
types of higher education subsidies (i.e., nonathletic).  While athletics offer a convenient 
example of a subsidy where performance data is readily available, future work may attempt to 
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study how other university subsidized activities are affected by performance.  Hopefully, the 
present study will prove beneficial to this future research. 
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Table 2.1: Model Variables, Descriptions, and Data Sources: Essay 2 
Variable 
Name Variable Long Name Variable Description 
Source 
Code 
subsidy Total Athletic Subsidy 
The sum of subsidy variable components: direct institutional 
aid, student fees, and indirect facilities and administrative 
support. 
1 
bball_w Basketball Wins The number of basketball wins during the season. 2 
fball_w Football Wins The number of football wins during the season. 2 
ncaa_fb_pct Football Winning Percentage 
The number of football wins divided by the total number of 





The total number of basketball and football wins divided by 
the total number of games played in both sports 
2 
sportcou Sport count 
The number of sponsored sports at the institution during the 
year. 
3 
enrollme FTE Enrollment FTE enrollment during the fall of the academic year. 4 
inst_rev Institutional Revenue Institutional revenue 4 
tickets Ticket Sales Revenue Revenue generated from ticket sales to athletic contests. 1 
bball_ppg Basketball Points Per Game Points scored per basketball game during the season. 2 
fball_ppg Football Points Per Game Points scored per football game during the season. 2 
bb_sos 
Basketball Strength of 
Schedule 
Strength of schedule for the basketball season. 5 
fb_sos Football Strength of Schedule Strength of schedule for the football season. 5 
CPI Consumer Price Index 








Code Variable Source URL 
1 





NCAA   
     Men's Basketball http://web1.ncaa.org/stats/StatsSrv/ranksummary?sportCode=MBB 
     Football http://web1.ncaa.org/stats/StatsSrv/rankings?doWhat=archive&sportCode=MFB  
3 




Integrated Postsecondary Education 
Data System (IPEDS) 
http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/  
5 
Jeff Sagarin Ratings   
     Men's Basketball http://www.usatoday.com/sports/ncaab/sagarin/  
     Football http://www.usatoday.com/sports/ncaaf/sagarin/  
6 
US Department of Labor, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/  
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics: Essay 2, All Institutions 
VARIABLES Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Subsidyt+1 (CPI-adj)           1,492  $8,743,728  $5,386,580  $0  $29,100,000  
Sport count           1,492                        14.86                           3.32                      6.00                           34.00  
Enrollment           1,492                 17,800.02                  10,246.14               1,362.00                    61,907.00  
Institutional rev. (CPI-adj)           1,492  $724,000,000  $860,000,000  $55,100,000  $6,930,000,000  
Ticket sales (CPI-adj.)           1,492  $5,899,966  $9,689,270  $58.96  $62,500,000  
Basketball wins           1,492                        16.46                           6.45                      2.00                           38.00  
Basketball PPG
*
           1,492                        69.26                           5.76                    54.20                         100.90  
Basketball SOS
†
           1,492                        72.89                           4.23                    61.48                           82.42  
Football wins           1,182                          6.11                           2.94  0                           14.00  
Football winning pct.           1,182  50.20% 21.81% 0% 100% 
Football PPG
*
           1,182                        26.17                           7.02                      7.45                           51.14  
Football SOS
†
           1,182                        60.86                         12.39                    25.15                           82.65  
Combined winning pct.           1,182  51.70% 14.45% 4.88% 92.45% 
      
Number of institutions 227     
Obs. per Institution: Min 1     
Obs. per Institution: Avg 6.57     
Obs. per Institution: Max 7         
*
 PPG = points per game.      
†
 SOS = strength of schedule.     
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics: Essay 2, BCS-only Institutions 
VARIABLES Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Subsidyt+1 (CPI-adj)              370  $5,762,542  $5,366,734  $0  $29,100,000  
Sport count              370                        17.67                           3.66                    12.00                           34.00  
Enrollment              370                 29,189.07                    9,537.67             13,418.00                    61,907.00  
Institutional rev. (CPI-adj)              370  $1,640,000,000  $1,140,000,000  $371,000,000  $6,930,000,000  
Ticket sales (CPI-adj.)              370  $20,100,000  $9,983,596  $4,349,168.00  $62,500,000  
Basketball wins              370                        20.18                           6.27                      6.00                           37.00  
Basketball PPG
*
              370                        71.33                           5.66                    55.90                           89.80  
Basketball SOS
†
              370                        78.28                           1.65                    73.49                           82.42  
Football wins              370                          7.32                           2.74  0                           14.00  
Football winning pct.              370  57.74% 19.62% 0% 100% 
Football PPG
*
              370                        27.93                           6.68                    12.00                           51.14  
Football SOS
†
              370                        73.61                           2.90                    65.37                           82.65  
Combined winning pct.              370  59.71% 12.12% 20.93% 92.45% 
      
Number of institutions 54     
Obs. per Institution: Min 2     
Obs. per Institution: Avg 6.85     
Obs. per Institution: Max 7         
*
 PPG = points per game.      
†
 SOS = strength of schedule.     
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics: Essay 2, Non-BCS Institutions 
VARIABLES Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Subsidyt+1 (CPI-adj)           1,122  $9,726,828  $5,021,016  $0  $29,100,000  
Sport count           1,122                        13.93                           2.61                      6.00                           24.00  
Enrollment           1,122                 14,044.27                    7,263.61               1,362.00                    46,122.00  
Institutional rev. (CPI-adj)           1,122  $422,000,000  $434,000,000  $55,100,000  $3,380,000,000  
Ticket sales (CPI-adj.)           1,122  $1,211,356  $1,826,321  $58.96  $15,000,000  
Basketball wins           1,122                        15.23                           6.03                      2.00                           38.00  
Basketball PPG
*
           1,122                        68.57                           5.63                    54.20                         100.90  
Basketball SOS
†
           1,122                        71.11                           3.19                    61.48                           79.49  
Football wins              812                          5.55                           2.86  0                           14.00  
Football winning pct.              812  46.77% 21.91% 0% 100% 
Football PPG
*
              812                        25.37                           7.03                      7.45                           49.75  
Football SOS
†
              812                        55.05                         10.57                    25.15                           75.12  
Combined winning pct.              812  48.05% 13.96% 4.88% 88.00% 
      
Number of institutions 176     
Obs. per Institution: Min 1     
Obs. per Institution: Avg 6.38     
Obs. per Institution: Max 7         
*
 PPG = points per game.      
†
 SOS = strength of schedule.     
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Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics: Essay 2, FBS Institutions 
VARIABLES Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Subsidyt+1 (CPI-adj)              678  $8,834,041  $6,239,550  $0  $29,100,000  
Sport count              678                        16.23                           3.41                    11.00                           34.00  
Enrollment              678                 24,502.00                    9,753.14               4,183.00                    61,907.00  
Institutional rev. (CPI-adj)              678  $1,170,000,000  $1,040,000,000  $125,000,000  $6,930,000,000  
Ticket sales (CPI-adj.)              678  $12,200,000  $11,500,000  $129,049.60  $62,500,000  
Basketball wins              678                        18.67                           6.53                      3.00                           38.00  
Basketball PPG
*
              678                        70.51                           5.45                    54.20                           89.80  
Basketball SOS
†
              678                        75.98                           3.20                    64.78                           82.42  
Football wins              678                          6.49                           2.93  0                           14.00  
Football winning pct.              678  51.57% 21.45% 0% 100% 
Football PPG
*
              678                        26.89                           7.03                      9.58                           51.14  
Football SOS
†
              678                        69.72                           5.37                    54.08                           82.65  
Combined winning pct.              678  55.45% 13.68% 13.16% 92.45% 
      
Number of institutions 99     
Obs. per Institution: Min 1     
Obs. per Institution: Avg 6.85     
Obs. per Institution: Max 7         
*
 PPG = points per game.      
†
 SOS = strength of schedule.     
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Table 2.6: Descriptive Statistics: Essay 2, FCS Institutions 
VARIABLES Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Subsidyt+1 (CPI-adj)              505  $8,910,412  $5,100,560  $0  $29,100,000  
Sport count              505                        13.88                           2.78                      9.00                           24.00  
Enrollment              505                 10,965.91                    5,724.69               1,362.00                    30,627.00  
Institutional rev. (CPI-adj)              505  $309,000,000  $359,000,000  $55,100,000  $3,380,000,000  
Ticket sales (CPI-adj.)              505  $775,794  $832,876  $29,914.52  $5,389,378  
Basketball wins              505                        14.19                           5.60                      2.00                           31.00  
Basketball PPG
*
              505                        67.93                           6.00                    54.80                         100.90  
Basketball SOS
†
              505                        69.87                           3.29                    61.48                           79.49  
Football wins              504                          5.60                           2.87  0                           14.00  
Football winning pct.              504  48.37% 22.18% 0% 100% 
Football PPG
*
              504                        25.21                           6.90                      7.45                           47.00  
Football SOS
†
              504                        48.94                           8.57                    25.15                           66.56  
Combined winning pct.              504  46.65% 13.93% 4.88% 81.25% 
      
Number of institutions 82     
Obs. per Institution: Min 1     
Obs. per Institution: Avg 6.16     
Obs. per Institution: Max 7         
*
 PPG = points per game.      
†
 SOS = strength of schedule.     
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Table 2.7: Panel Regression Using Basketball Success 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Full Model BCS-Only Non-BCS 
 Subsidyt+1 Subsidyt+1 Subsidyt+1 
VARIABLES (CPI adj.) (CPI adj.) (CPI adj.) 
        
Basketball wins 11,242 32,373* 3,610 
 (9,531) (19,148) (11,505) 
Enrollment 84.12 -309,100* 169,894** 
 (116.8) (177,932) (74,693) 
Sport count 100,941 -72.33 300.6*** 
 (80,403) (90.37) (100.8) 
Institutional rev. (CPI-adj) -0.000610 -1.50e-05 0.000325 
 (0.000462) (0.000285) (0.00209) 
Ticket sales (CPI-adj.) -0.214*** -0.108* 0.123 
 (0.0449) (0.0549) (0.187) 
Constant 8.565e+06*** 1.430e+07*** 4.110e+06** 
 (2.358e+06) (3.749e+06) (2.037e+06) 
    
Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES 
    
Observations 1,492 370 1,122 
Number of institutions 227 54 176 
R-squared 0.279 0.066 0.402 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.8: IV Approach, Basketball Wins Instrumented on SOS and PPG 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Full Model BCS-Only Non-BCS 
 Subsidyt+1 Subsidyt+1 Subsidyt+1 
VARIABLES (CPI adj.) (CPI adj.) (CPI adj.) 
        
Basketball wins 38,083** 104,163*** 11,819 
 (17,409) (32,946) (19,748) 
Enrollment 103,664** -290,168** 170,730*** 
 (50,799) (122,794) (53,011) 
Sport count 82.53* -89.67 300.7*** 
 (45.85) (69.12) (64.90) 
Institutional rev. (CPI-adj) -0.000599* -6.92e-05 0.000387 
 (0.000361) (0.000426) (0.00102) 
Ticket sales (CPI-adj.) -0.216*** -0.116*** 0.118 
 (0.0331) (0.0424) (0.133) 
    
Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES 
First-stage F 296.84*** 82.90*** 206.38*** 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 293.77 80.49 207.29 
Sargan statistic 0.111 0.946 0.003 
    
Observations 1,490 370 1,117 
Number of institutions 225 54 171 
R-squared 0.275 0.025 0.401 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.9: Panel Regression Using Football Success 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Full Model FBS FCS 
 Subsidyt+1 Subsidyt+1 Subsidyt+1 
VARIABLES (CPI adj.) (CPI adj.) (CPI adj.) 
        
Football winning pct (*100) 800.6   
 (3,941)   
Football wins  21,505 -23,817 
  (45,712) (33,897) 
Enrollment 42,729 3,902 44,380 
 (91,722) (188,567) (87,037) 
Sport count 20.65 -61.65 334.3 
 (110.5) (99.49) (219.5) 
Institutional rev. (CPI-adj) -0.000602 -0.000654 -0.00237 
 (0.000473) (0.000509) (0.00209) 
Ticket sales (CPI-adj.) -0.212*** -0.231*** 0.0137 
 (0.0463) (0.0520) (0.352) 
Constant 1.114e+07*** 1.203e+07*** 4.311e+06 
 (2.382e+06) (3.335e+06) (2.883e+06) 
    
Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES 
    
Observations 1,183 678 505 
Number of institutions 179 99 82 
R-squared 0.247 0.214 0.360 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.10: IV Approach, Football Wins Instrumented on SOS and PPG 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Full Model FBS FCS 
 Subsidyt+1 Subsidyt+1 Subsidyt+1 
VARIABLES (CPI adj.) (CPI adj.) (CPI adj.) 
        
Football winning pct (*100) 5,735   
 (4,986)   
Football wins  47,483 22,490 
  (55,183) (49,636) 
Enrollment 42,765 4,965 41,240 
 (59,654) (113,713) (56,192) 
Sport count 22.77 -60.38 344.4*** 
 (51.32) (65.18) (103.7) 
Institutional rev. (CPI-adj) -0.000618 -0.000666 -0.00238 
 (0.000380) (0.000450) (0.00161) 
Ticket sales (CPI-adj.) -0.215*** -0.234*** -0.0633 
 (0.0351) (0.0425) (0.299) 
    
Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES 
First-stage F 359.94*** 222.37*** 105.63*** 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 337.44 199.00 100.10 
Sargan statistic 0.144 1.454 1.147 
    
Observations 1,177 677 499 
Number of institutions 174 98 77 
R-squared 0.245 0.213 0.355 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.11: Panel Regression Using Basketball and Football Success 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full Model FBS FCS BCS-Only Non-BCS 
 Subsidyt+1 Subsidyt+1 Subsidyt+1 Subsidyt+1 Subsidyt+1 
VARIABLES (CPI adj.) (CPI adj.) (CPI adj.) (CPI adj.) (CPI adj.) 
            
Combined winning pct (*100) 7,092 7,744 7,066 18,128* 2,211 
 (4,955) (8,134) (5,923) (9,894) (6,136) 
Enrollment 43,750 2,086 44,839 -309,523* 150,308 
 (91,100) (188,001) (85,085) (178,138) (92,152) 
Sport count 20.63 -62.31 337.1 -69.64 294.6** 
 (110.8) (101.3) (218.2) (89.16) (120.6) 
Institutional rev. (CPI-adj) -0.000595 -0.000642 -0.00237 -2.69e-05 -0.000159 
 (0.000461) (0.000502) (0.00220) (0.000284) (0.00238) 
Ticket sales (CPI-adj.) -0.214*** -0.232*** -0.0576 -0.111** -0.0135 
 (0.0463) (0.0516) (0.358) (0.0553) (0.196) 
Constant 1.080e+07*** 1.507e+07*** 3.875e+06 1.385e+07*** 5.432e+06** 
 (2.435e+06) (3.414e+06) (2.936e+06) (3.795e+06) (2.458e+06) 
      
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
      
Observations 1,183 678 505 370 813 
Number of institutions 179 99 82 54 128 
R-squared 0.249 0.215 0.361 0.067 0.381 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.12: IV Approach, Basketball and Football Wins Instrumented on SOS and PPG 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full FBS FCS BCS-Only Non-BCS 
 Subsidyt+1 Subsidyt+1 Subsidyt+1 Subsidyt+1 Subsidyt+1 
VARIABLES (CPI adj.) (CPI adj.) (CPI adj.) (CPI adj.) (CPI adj.) 
            
Combined winning pct (*100) 29,322*** 32,256** 18,397* 47,491*** 18,894* 
 (8,711) (12,678) (10,204) (16,169) (9,889) 
Enrollment 46,994 -876.9 47,860 -296,380** 152,240** 
 (60,089) (114,463) (56,216) (121,585) (65,484) 
Sport count 21.57 -61.06 334.5*** -77.96 299.3*** 
 (51.64) (65.56) (103.3) (68.18) (83.66) 
Institutional rev. (CPI-adj) -0.000579 -0.000635 -0.00236 -8.58e-05 0.000158 
 (0.000382) (0.000452) (0.00161) (0.000423) (0.00117) 
Ticket sales (CPI-adj.) -0.219*** -0.240*** -0.107 -0.121*** -0.0543 
 (0.0353) (0.0427) (0.291) (0.0423) (0.149) 
      
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
First-stage F 139.47*** 106.34*** 44.44*** 50.82*** 87.81*** 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 135.46 102.20 42.96 49.27 85.88 
Sargan statistic 0.763 4.196 3.193 4.082 2.546 
      
Observations 1177 677 499 370 804 
Number of institutions 174 98 77 54 120 
R-squared 0.234 0.203 0.354 0.042 0.373 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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ESSAY 3 
THE EFFECTS OF MAKING THE NCAA MEN’S BASKETBALL TOURNAMENT ON 
BASKETBALL, ATHLETIC, AND INSTITUTIONAL REVENUES 
 The NCAA men’s basketball tournament – affectionately known as March Madness – is 
one of the biggest sporting events of the year.  All season long, teams across the country vie for 
one of the coveted 68 slots in the field.  31 of the 68 slots are reserved for the winners of each of 
the conference tournaments.
10
  The remaining 37 “at-large” bids are awarded to teams by a 
selection committee that is typically comprised of ten athletic directors and conference 
commissioners.  The selection process is secretive, but a combination of factors are believed to 
be used, such as total number of wins throughout the season, strength of schedule, and “signature 
wins” against top opponents.  The process culminates in “Selection Sunday,” when the 
tournament brackets and first-round matchups are revealed live on television.   
The drama of Selection Sunday is most intense for the so-called “bubble teams” that are 
vying for one of the last at-large bids to participate in the tournament.  Making the field of 68 
ensures that these teams receive the attention and exposure associated with the prestigious 
tournament.  One might expect that this exposure would have positive effects on these athletic 
programs and their host institutions.  In fact, some research has considered the varied effects of 
successful athletic programs (e.g., Toma & Cross, 1998, Baade & Sundberg, 1996; Sigelman & 
Bookheimer, 1983; Humphreys & Mondello, 2007; Humphreys, 2006, Mixon, 1995).  The 
purpose of this study is to consider the specific effects of participating in the NCAA men’s 
basketball tournament on different revenue streams.   
                                                          
10
 The Ivy League does not conduct a postseason conference tournament, so its automatic bid is awarded to the 
regular season champion. 
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One of the findings in the analysis of institutional subsidies presented in Essay 2 was that 
basketball success, in particular, may impact the amount of institutional resources contributed to 
athletics.  In other words, there was suggestive evidence that institutions allocate more resources 
to athletics based on success.  This essay tests this relationship more rigorously.  Of course, 
institutional subsidies are only one of the revenue streams for athletics, and the question remains 
as to whether athletics success leads to an overall financial effect.  To address this question, I 
evaluate the effects of making the NCAA men’s basketball tournament on basketball-specific 
revenues, total athletic revenues, and institutional revenues.
11
   
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 This study addresses the following three research questions: 
1. What is the effect of making the NCAA men’s basketball tournament on basketball 
revenues? 
2. What is the effect of making the NCAA men’s basketball tournament on total athletic 
revenues? 
3. What is the effect of making the NCAA men’s basketball tournament on total 
university revenues? 
The key distinction between these questions is, of course, the type of revenue being 
evaluated.  The first question specifically addresses athletic revenues specifically allocated to an 
institution’s men’s basketball program; the second question considers total athletic department 
revenues, including all ticket sales and athletic donations; and the third research question 
addresses university revenues, like student tuition.   
                                                          
11
 The men’s NCAA basketball tournament is the focus of this study because of its great popularity and large 
revenue base, but the women’s NCAA basketball tournament could be analyzed as a future extension of this study. 
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Given that teams may receive NCAA and conference payouts for participating in the 
tournament, I hypothesize that making the tournament will have a positive effect on basketball 
revenues and total athletic revenues in the tournament year.  This could be considered a baseline 
effect; but another interesting question is whether making the tournament one year has an impact 
on revenues in a subsequent year.  This would be a type of carryover effect that may result from 
the increased exposure derived from making the tournament.  For example, more fans may 
purchase season tickets after watching their team compete in the NCAA tournament the prior 
year.  In this way, I analyze the significance and magnitude of the same-year effect, as well as 
the persistence and relative magnitude of any carryover effect in the subsequent year.  
The relationship between a school’s NCAA tournament appearance and its total 
institutional revenues is less certain.  However, given the advertising effect suggested by Toma 
and Cross (1998) and others, it may be reasonable to expect institutions to monetize the 
increased interest resulting from basketball tournament success.  One way that they could realize 
higher revenues would be to enroll more students and collect more tuition revenue, which would 
be a rational response if applications indeed jump.  Obviously, most institutional revenues are 
already determined by the time of the men’s basketball tournament in March, so next-year 
effects are more interesting than same-year effects on institutional revenues. 
Related Literature 
Athletics Literature 
A fair amount of research has looked at the effects of successful athletic programs.  
Athletic success is typically operationalized as men’s basketball or football success.  Toma and 
Cross (1998) found evidence of the “advertising effect” and suggests that winning the men’s 
basketball national championship has a positive effect on applications.  Several studies have 
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considered financial effects of athletic success.  Most of these studies have focused on the effects 
of success on donations directly to athletic departments and the broader institution (e.g., Baade & 
Sundberg, 1996; Sigelman & Bookheimer, 1983; Humphreys & Mondello, 2007).  The findings 
from these studies are not always consistent, but they do provide some evidence of a positive 
relationship between athletics and some form of donations.  However, a drawback of this 
literature is that it does not attempt to make causal inferences. 
 Anderson (2012) addressed the effects of athletic success on various outcomes, including 
donations.  This study is unique in that it employed quasi-experimental propensity score methods 
with instrumental variables to estimate causal effects.  Anderson used bookmaker spreads to 
assign probabilities of winning for each team in each game.  These probabilities represented his 
propensity scores for receiving the treatment, which in this case was winning the game.  He then 
conditioned on these probabilities to make causal inferences about winning football games on 
various outcomes.   
Applying this framework [he] found robust evidence that football success increases 
athletic donations, increases the number of applicants, lowers a school’s acceptance rate, 
increases enrollment of in-state students, increases the average SAT score of incoming 
classes, and enhances a school’s academic reputation.  (p. 3)  
Each additional football win increased athletic donations by $136,400, number of applicants by 
1%, and the 25
th
 percentile SAT score by 1.8 points.   
 While Anderson (2012) offers a unique application of quasi-experimental research design 
in intercollegiate athletic literature, it is not without limitations.  Anderson only considers the 
effects of success in football.  It is common in the literature to use football success as a proxy for 
overall athletic success, but it is, nevertheless, a possible limitation.  Anderson’s data also only 
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includes institutions in the NCAA’s Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS).  This subset of 
intercollegiate athletics participants, of course, includes the most prominent sports programs.  
There may very well be differential effects of success across subdivisions.  In fact, Anderson’s 
analysis suggests that the success may affect Bowl Championship Series (BCS) teams – those in 
the top six conferences – differently than non-BCS teams.  Anderson’s study makes an important 
contribution by applying an quasi-experimental design to study the effects of athletics success on 
several outcomes, but this study employs a different quasi-experimental approach with a broader 
sample, uses a different type of success (basketball instead of football), and considers the effects 
of success on a different type of outcome variable, namely financial revenues.  In short, this 
study will address the financial effects of athletics success, which was not a focus of Anderson’s 
study. 
Regression Discontinuity Literature 
There have been several general studies that have applied quasi-experimental designs to 
higher education topics and some have specifically used regression discontinuity design, which 
will be utilized in this study.  Cook (2008) describes the history of regression discontinuity 
designs.  The design was first developed by Thistlewaite and Campbell (1960), and its popularity 
has varied by discipline.  Despite its early discovery, interest in regression discontinuity did not 
pick up until after 1990 in education and psychology, and after 1995 in economics (Cook, 2008).  
The strength of the regression discontinuity design is its ability to produce unbiased estimates of 
the treatment effect in situations where performing a random experiment are impractical.  “The 
basic idea behind the [regression discontinuity] design is that assignment to the treatment is 
determined, either completely or partly, by the value of a predictor (the covariate Xi) being on 
either side of a fixed threshold” (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008, p. 616).  By exploiting this 
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discontinuity in treatment assignment, researchers may make causal inferences, potentially 
providing much more robust and meaningful findings. 
Interestingly, Thistlewaite and Campbell’s (1960) original work on regression 
discontinuity design was in the higher education context.  They evaluated the casual effects of 
public recognition for achievement on college aptitude tests on the likelihood that the recipient 
will receive and scholarship, the student’s attitudes, and the student’s career plans.  Van der 
Klaauw (2002) also used a regression discontinuity design in a higher education study evaluating 
the effects of financial aid offers on student enrollment decisions.  The college in his study 
ranked applicants based on test scores and used quartile cutoffs to determine, in part, the amount 
of the financial aid offer.  Van der Klaauw used the discontinuity in the aid offers around the 
cutoffs to evaluate the effects of the institution’s aid offers on enrollment decisions.  Because 
there were other unobserved factors contributing to the aid offers, this was an application of a 
fuzzy regression discontinuity design.  Additional studies have used regression discontinuity 
designs to evaluate need-based (Kane, 2003), merit-based (Goodman, 2008), and hybrid 
(DesJardins, McCall, Ott, & Kim, 2010) financial aid programs.  Financial aid programs lend 
themselves well to regression discontinuity design since they typically involve a threshold (e.g., 
minimum GPA, maximum income) for award eligibility. 
Regression discontinuity design has been subjected to robustness checks by researchers at 
various times.  This typically involves within-study comparisons.  Cook, Shadish, and Wong 
(2008) compared experiments and regression discontinuity studies and found them to produce 
similar causal estimates near the cut score.  Their findings were somewhat surprising since their 
studies involved complex situations where they admitted that the implementation of the 
experiment and the regression discontinuity would likely be imperfect.  The fact that they 
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received similar results under these circumstances, led them to conclude that regression 
discontinuity is a “robustly effective tool” (p. 732).  
Data and Methods 
Data from for this study came from multiple sources.  Table 3.1 presents variable 
descriptions and source information for all of the data used in this study.  The primary source 
was the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act (EADA) survey conducted by the U.S. Department of 
Education.  This survey gathers a variety of gender-specific information on institutions’ 
intercollegiate athletic activities.  Its purpose is to allow for comparisons of athletic opportunities 
at institutions and it is mandatory for all institutions that participate in Title IV federal financial 
aid programs (U.S. Department of Education, n.d.).  The mandatory nature of the survey makes it 
a more comprehensive dataset than other athletics finance data sources that might only include 
data for a subset of institutions (e.g., the USA Today Athletics Finance Database).  However, the 
finance data elements are somewhat limited.  Revenues and expenses are reported by sport and 
by gender, but not by source or type.  This level of detail is sufficient for the present study, but 
limits the survey’s usefulness for studies that call for more detailed accounting information, like 
the study of institutional subsidies in Essay 2. 
In addition to the EADA database, the institutional revenues variable was obtained from 
the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS).   Data on basketball performance 
was compiled from Sports Reference, a leading provider of sports information.  Unfortunately, I 
was not able to obtain a preexisting database from Sports Reference, but I did receive permission 
to but a build a dataset from the information available on their website: http://www.sports-




  Sports Reference data was chosen for this study because it included 




Data in the study is structured as a panel and covers the 12 years that the EADA survey 
has been conducted: the 2000-01 through 2011-12 academic years and the corresponding 2001 
through 2012 NCAA men’s basketball tournaments.  Table 3.2 shows descriptive statistics for 
the sample after omitting missing values.  The data was also cleaned of data errors.  There were 
13 negative values for institutional revenues, so these observations were omitted from the 
analyses.  There was also a value for total athletic revenues of $823 million at San Diego State 
University in 2001.  Determining that this value was likely also a data error, this observation was 
omitted from the base sample.  After cleaning, there were 3,515 observations in the base sample.  
However, there was not an institutional revenue value available in IPEDS for all of these 
observations, so analyses of institutional revenues are limited to 3,480 observations.
14
  
Basketball revenues in the sample, CPI-adjusted, averaged just over $3 million, and ranged from 
$25,400 (Loyola University-Maryland in 2002) to $41.7 million (University of Louisville in 
2011).  Total athletic revenues, CPI-adjusted, averaged $22.8 million, and ranged from $165,841 
(Coppin State University in 2002) and $163 million (University of Texas in 2012).  Institutional 
revenues, CPI-adjusted, averaged $673 million, and ranged from $2.7 million (College of Holy 
Cross in 2009) to $11.3 billion (Harvard University in 2007).   
                                                          
12
 I made multiple attempts to obtain both financial and records data from the NCAA.  They informed me that they 
are not allowed to share finance data per their membership agreement.  The basketball records data that they shared 
had several missing values and data quality issues.  As a result, I decided to use data from Sports Reference. 
13
 Other sources, like the NCAA data used in Essay 2, only include a total wins figure. 
14
 Missing values appeared to be largely a result of IPEDS parent-child issues related to branch campuses (see 
Jaquette and Parra, 2014).  It is not believed that these missing values introduce any clear bias to this sample; the 35 
missing values correspond to 27 different institutions. 
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Descriptive statistics for the components of the composite assignment variable, which is 
described in detail below, are also presented in Table 3.2.  Regular season wins averaged 14.34 
and ranged from 0 to 30.
15
  Conference tournament wins averaged 0.59 and ranged from 0 to 3.  
Finally, strength of schedule average 0.30 and ranged from -15.81 to 12.70.  It should be noted 
that I am using the strength of schedule values published by Sports Reference.  Different sports 
data providers calculate strength of schedule differently, which results in different absolute 
values and scales.  The Sports Reference calculation utilizes opponents’ average point spreads 
and includes all opponents except non-Division I teams (Sports Reference, 2014).  A larger 
strength of schedule value signifies that a team’s opponents have been more successful. 
The NCAA men’s basketball tournament serves as the quasi-experiment, with the teams 
making the field in the treatment group and those not making the tournament serving as the 
control.  Just as van der Klaauw (2002) had information on the assignment rules of financial aid 
that allowed him to employ a regression discontinuity design, I was able to exploit what is 
known about the selection mechanism for NCAA tournament to employ a similar regression 
discontinuity design.   
Selection is based on a team’s performance up to the point of the NCAA tournament.  
This includes regular season games and games played in postseason conference tournaments.  
The path to selection, however, varies for different teams.  Automatic bids to the NCAA 
tournament are reserved for the winners of each of the conference tournaments.  For teams 
participating in the smaller athletic conferences, this may be the only path to the tournament.  
“At-large” bids are awarded by a selection committee to the best remaining teams.  Teams from 
the largest athletic conferences typically receive the vast majority of the at-large bids, but these 
                                                          
15
 Although not shown in Table 3.2, total number of regular season games played averaged 28.72 and ranged from 
16 to 32. 
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at-large bids are open to all Division I teams.  These at-large bids are the focus of this paper.  I 
am asserting that assignment into the treatment group (i.e., being selected as an at-large bid into 
the tournament) can be closely replicated through a developed assignment variable that 
incorporates factors believed to be considered by the selection committee, even though the 
committee’s precise selection/assignment method is not known. 
Number of wins is the most objective measure of a team’s performance prior to the 
NCAA tournament and forms the basis of the developed assignment variable.  In fact, number of 
wins was the initial inspiration to evaluate the effects of the tournament with a regression 
discontinuity approach since it has generally been accepted that 20 wins is a “magic number” of 
wins for teams from the largest conferences to lock up a tournament spot.  However, in order to 
include all institutions in the sample, a more nuanced assignment variable was needed for this 
study.  The selection committee undoubtedly considers additional factors besides number of wins 
when determining who receives the at-large bids.  For example, overall strength of schedule, 
non-conference strength of schedule, and performance in recent games are factors that are often 
discussed as possible selection criteria.  Non-conference strength of schedule, in particular, has 
been cited as receiving priority by the selection committee (Stevens, 2013), but the exact criteria 
and the weights given to each are kept private and not released by the selection committee.   
The first step, then, was to develop a metric that predicted tournament selection based on 
these known criteria.  Because the actual selection process is not disclosed, this task was 
somewhat subjective in nature, but the following formula used to establish the assignment 
variable for this study: 
Xit = Wreg,it + (2*(SOSit – 6)/ssos) + (SOSit – SOSconf,i) + (1.15*Wconf,it) (3.1) 
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where Xit is the assignment score for institution, i, in year, t; Wreg,it is the number of regular 
season wins for institution, i, in year, t; SOSit is the strength of schedule for institution, i, in year, 
t; ssos is the sample standard deviation for strength of schedule; SOSconf,i is the mean strength of 
schedule for the conference of institution, i; and Wconf,it is the number of conference tournament 
wins for institution, i, in year, t.   
In short, the assignment score uses the number of regular season wins as the foundation 
for tournament selection, and institutions are essentially rewarded bonus points for a high 
strength of schedule, a strength of schedule value in excess of the conference mean across the 
sample, and recent performance.  The general strength of schedule contribution to the assignment 
score was normalized around six, which, upon inspection of the data, appeared to be a reasonable 
strength of schedule for an at-large bid.  Strength of schedule for the entire sample average -0.30 
and ranged from -15.81 to 12.70.  However, for institutions that received at-large bids, strength 
of schedule averaged 7.17 and ranged from -1.82 to 12.70.  Furthermore, the average number of 
regular season wins was notably higher for the at-large bids with a SOS less than six than it was 
for at-large bids with a SOS of more than six, 23.04 and 21.39 respectively.  This may suggest 
that SOS was additive to the selection score of teams with a SOS greater than six, but not 
necessarily for the teams with a SOS less than six, whose selection was likely more heavily 
influenced by the higher number of wins.  In order to normalize and scale the SOS contribution 
appropriately in relation to regular season wins, the difference was divided by the standard 
deviation and multiplied by two.  Another way of thinking about this component of the 
assignment score is that institutions receive two bonus points (the equivalent of 2 wins) for each 
standard deviation that their SOS exceeds six. 
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I did not have a variable for nonconference strength of schedule, but by subtracting an 
institution’s strength of schedule from their conference’s average, I obtained a proxy for the 
institution’s strength of schedule relative to its conference peers.  Since an institution plays a 
considerable number of games against its conference peers, and thus its strength of schedule is 
determined in large part by its conference counterparts, the difference between the institution’s 
strength of schedule and the conference mean may serve as an approximate proxy for the 
institution’s nonconference strength of schedule.   
Likewise, I did not have game-by-game results that would allow for the inclusion of a 
true measure of recent performance (for example, number of wins in the past 10 games).  
However, I did have the number of conference tournament wins.  Since these are games played 
after the regular season and before the NCAA tournament, this may serve as a measure of a 
team’s recent performance.  As such, these recent games receive a 15% premium in the 
assignment score.  15% was chosen so as to recognize the “hot” teams but not overweight the 
impact of these final games before selection.  For at-large bids, the number of conference 
tournament wins in the sample ranges from zero to three, so the maximum excess benefit that a 
team gets from these wins is approximately equal to half a regular season win. 
It is not expected that this developed assignment score will perfectly predict tournament 
status.  It includes the criteria that have been mentioned as potential selection criteria and for 
which I have data.  Other possible criteria that the committee may consider, but for which I had 
no data, include injuries to key players or “signature wins” against top opponents.  Members of 
the selection committee may also be biased because of their ties to institutions or conferences.  
Because of these additional factors, my assignment measure of wins is understandably not the 
sole determinant of treatment status.  Thus, I employed a fuzzy regression discontinuity design 
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where the likelihood of receiving the treatment varies with the assignment variable, but is 
discontinuous at the rating score.  This fuzzy regression discontinuity, where the probability of 
treatment jumps at the cut score, is different from a sharp regression discontinuity where the 
probability actually jumps from zero to 1 at the cut score.  If my assignment score was solely 
deterministic of NCAA tournament selection, this study would use a sharp RD design.   
The next step was to analyze the existence of a discontinuity in the composite assignment 
score.  Figure 3.1 shows a basic graph of the probability of making the tournament by 
assignment score.  In Figure 3.1, the bin size used to determine the probability of making the 
tournament is one.  The probability for each bin, then, is simply the number of teams that made 
the tournament divided by the total number of institutions with an assignment score in that 
particular bin (e.g., an assignment score between 20 and 21).  In Figure 3.1, there does seem to 
be a distinct jump in the probability of making the tournament around an assignment score of 21.  
In order to see if this discontinuity stood up to a more granulated view, and to pinpoint a more 
precise location of the discontinuity, I create a similar chart, but with a bin size of 0.25, which 
can be seen in Figure 3.2.  Here the discontinuity is less pronounced, but there does appear to be 
jump at an assignment score of 21.25.   
To further test the significance of the discontinuity, I ran a regression of the following 
equation: 
Y = α + β1X1 + β2X1
2
 + β3X1X2 + β4X1
2
X2 + β5X2 + ε   (3.2) 
where Y is the propensity score for making the tournament given the assignment score (bin size 
= 0.25), X1 is the assignment score centered around the cut score of 21.25, and X2 is a dummy 
variable for exceeding the cut score of 21.25.  The quadratic terms and interaction terms are 
included because the relationship does not appear to be linear in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.  Table 3.3 
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shows the results of this regression analysis.  The result of interest in this regression is the 
significance of the coefficient for the dummy variable, β5 (labeled as the variable Cut Score 
Dummy in Table 3.3), which represents the jump in the probability of making the tournament 
associated with having an assignment score of at least 21.25.  The coefficient is statistically 
significant at the p < .01 level and the sign is positive.  This result supports the discontinuity 
assumption that the probability of making the tournament increases significantly when the 
composite assignment score of 21.25 is reached. 
Figure 3.3 shows the conceptual framework for this study.  It highlights the assignment 
variable, treatment variable (participation in the NCAA tournament), and the outcome variables 
of interest (basketball, athletics, and institutional revenues).  The conceptual model also 
highlights the control variable that is used in some analyses, which will be discussed in more 
detail below, and a key assumption of the regression discontinuity design.  At the discontinuity, 
it is assumed that observed and unobserved covariates – depicted as X’s and U’s respectively in 
Figure 3.3 – impact the treatment and control groups in the same way, and can thus be ignored.  
In other words, I am assuming that the only difference at the cutoff point is the treatment status.  
While this condition cannot necessarily be fully tested, baseline characteristics can be compared 
within in narrow range of the cut score to determine if the observations just on one side of the cut 
score are different than those on the other side of the cut score.  Appropriate baseline 
characteristics for comparison are not always obvious or available, but in my case, it made sense 
to compare number of athletes, number of sponsored sports, institutional enrollment, and 
institutional tuition.  These variables generally measure athletic department size and institutional 
size, so they will give a sense of whether institutions and their athletic departments just under the 
cut score are, on average, the same as institutions just above the cut score.  Table 3.4 shows 
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descriptive statistics for the observations just below and just above the cut score of 21.25 (bin 
size = 1).  The means suggest that the two subgroups have very similar baseline characteristics. 
One of the conditions of the regression discontinuity design is that variation in the 
treatment near the cut score is assumed to be randomized.  However, a common violation of this 
condition is when the agents can manipulate the assignment variable.  If agents can manipulate 
the assignment variable and the treatment is a benefit that they desire, they have an incentive to 
arrange for an assignment score that receives the treatment.  McCrary (2008) points out that this 
may result in “surprisingly many individuals just barely qualifying for a desirable treatment 
assignment and surprisingly few failing to qualify” (p. 699).  McCrary proposes a test for 
evaluating the discontinuity in the density function of the assignment variable around the cut 
score.  The estimator for this discontinuity is shown in Table 3.5 and a graphical representation is 
shown in Figure 3.4.  The estimator and the graphical evidence suggest that the discontinuity in 
the density function is not significant.  This is not surprising given that the assignment variable 
in this case has been developed and is presumably unknown by agents, but more importantly, the 
actual selection criteria are also unknown to agents.  Number of wins, which is the primary 
component of the composite assignment variable, is also difficult to manipulate.  In theory, one 
team could devise a schedule with weak opponents in an attempt to maximize wins, but this 
should lead to a low strength of schedule, which also contributes to the assignment score.  In 
other words, the composite assignment variable in this study should be difficult to manipulate 
and the agents do not know the cut score for treatment status. 
The fuzzy regression discontinuity design implemented in this study includes two steps.  
The first step assigns propensity scores based on the number of wins.  This step is essentially 
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specifying an instrumental variable and is described by the following equations which have been 
closely adapted from Lee and Lemieux (2009): 
 Dit = γ + δTit + g(X – c) + vit       (3.3) 
where X is the assignment variable of wins, Dit is the probability of institution, i, making the 
NCAA tournament in year, t, given their assignment score (i.e., Pr(D=1 | X=x)), Tit is an 
indicator variable for the assignment variable exceeding the cut score, g(·) is the functional form 
of X centered around the cut score of c, and vit is an error term independent of X.  In Equation 
3.3, δ represents the increase in the probability of receiving the treatment when the assignment 
variable exceeds the cut score.
16
  The second step in the process can be specified by: 
 Yit = α + τDit + f(X – c) + εit       (3.4) 
where Yit is the outcome variable of basketball, athletic, or institutional revenue for institution, i, 
in year, t.  X is still the assignment variable, τ is the treatment effect, Dit is the estimated 
propensity score from Equation 3.3, f(·) is the functional form (e.g., linear would be β(X – c)), 
and εit is the unobserved error term.  For the analyses of effects in the subsequent year, the 
dependent variable in Equation 3.4 can be written as Yi(t+1).  Subsequent year, t + 1, has been 
chosen for this analysis simply because of its proximity to the treatment effect and is when one 
would expect to find any effect on subsequent ticket sales, tuition revenue, etc.  It is not clearly 
evident how any carryover effects, if real, can be expected to last, so only the one-year lead is 
tested here.   
 As apparent in Equations 3.3 and 3.4, the dataset is structured as a panel identified by 
institution-year.  However, Lee and Lemieux (2010) point out that including individual or time 
                                                          
16
 Results from this first-stage are included in Appendix C. 
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fixed-effects, which typically accompany panel data analysis, is not necessary for RD designs.  
Others have also recommended against using any covariates in a regression discontinuity design 
because they could reduce efficiency and greatly increase bias (Nichols, 2011).  For this reason, 
my models do not include any covariates.   
Results and Discussion 
 As mentioned earlier, there are two time periods of interest for the dependent variables in 
the models: the year of the tournament appearance and the year following the tournament 
appearance.  These time periods correspond to same-year and next-year effects on my dependent 
variables.  Separate tables are presented for each time period.  In addition to models run with all 
institutions, analyses have been run with a restricted sample that only includes institutions that 
belong to conferences that received a substantial number of at-large bids.  The conferences 
included in this restricted sample are discussed in more detail below, and this restriction serves to 
limit the sample to institutions that are more similar to one another.  In each of the tables 
discussed below, results for all three dependent variables – basketball revenues, total athletic 
revenues, and institutional revenues – are presented.  Each of the results tables shows results 
using the optimal bandwidth based on Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009).  In addition, results at 
three additional bandwidths are presented.  These alternative bandwidths were chosen such that 
points on both sides of the optimal bandwidths for the same-year, full model (Table 3.6) were 
selected.  These additional bandwidths will allow for a discussion of the sensitivity of the results 
to bandwidth selection. 
Table 3.6 presents the regression discontinuity results for the effects of making the 
tournament on the three different types of revenue in the same year as the tournament 
appearance.  The results suggest a positive effect of making the tournament on basketball 
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revenues (p<0.05) and total athletic revenues (p<0.1 or smaller) at the optimal bandwidth and all 
alternative bandwidths.  These findings are not surprising given my hypotheses and the fact that 
these two revenue types are related.  In fact, given the existence of tournament payouts, it would 
have been unexpected to not find a positive effect.  The magnitude of effect on basketball 
revenues was approximately $2.8 million and the magnitude of effect on total athletic revenues 
was approximately $14.8 million.  The size of the effect for basketball revenues ($2.8 million) is 
higher than a recent estimate of the NCAA payout for making the tournament of $1.5 million 
(Smith, 2013).  However, this estimate was only for the payouts from the NCAA’s basketball 
fund.  One would expect to find a higher effect on all basketball revenues, so $2.8 million does 
not seem unreasonable.  The size of the spread between these effect sizes on basketball revenues 
and total athletic revenues is a little surprising.  Some difference between the two effects might 
be expected as certain types of athletic department revenues affected by the tournament 
appearance may not be allocated to basketball.  For example, royalties from general merchandise 
sales, which might be expected to increase as a result of a tournament appearance, may not be 
allocated to specific sports.  These types of revenues would show up in the total athletic revenue 
variable, but not the basketball revenue variable.  For this reason, a difference in the effect sizes 
between total athletic revenues and basketball revenues may be explainable and even expected.  
However, size of the difference in these results – approximately $12 million – is large. 
No significant effect was found on institutional revenues.  However, institutional 
revenues are largely determined before a team’s NCAA tournament appearance.  In large part, 
these revenues are determined at the beginning of the academic year, when enrollments, tuition, 
and state appropriations (in the case of public institutions) are set.  Other types of institutional 
revenues, like grants and contracts or donations, may be determined throughout the year, but 
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testing the effects of an NCAA appearance on same-year institutional revenues is probably not 
the proper test.  One of the main mechanisms through which I hypothesized that making the 
tournament could impact institutional revenues was through increased tuition revenues realized 
by institutions capitalizing on the “advertising effect” and subsequent increases in applications.  
This effect could only take place in a subsequent enrollment cycle, so a better assessment of the 
effect of making the tournament on institutional revenues requires a one-year lead measure of 
revenues. 
In Table 3.7, regression discontinuity results are shown when the outcome variables are 
measured in the year following the tournament appearance.  At all bandwidths, the tournament 
appearance has a significant effect on basketball revenues (p<0.1 or smaller), but no significant 
effect on total athletic revenues or institutional revenues.  The magnitude of effect on basketball 
revenues is approximately $2.7 million, meaning that making the NCAA tournament is 
associated with an increase in revenues of $2.7 million.  This result is very similar to the same-
year effect on basketball revenues (Table 3.6).  Collectively, these results suggest that there is a 
carry-over effect for making the tournament on basketball revenues, but not other types of 
revenues.  This is a little surprising since one would expect that any effect on basketball revenues 
would show up in total athletic revenues as well. 
While Table 3.6 and 3.7 present results for the regression discontinuity model run will all 
institutions eligible for at-large bids, historical evidence shows that some conferences fare much 
better than others in obtaining at-large bids than others.  In fact, some conferences did not have a 
single at-large bid in this 12-year sample.  While the assignment variable should account for any 
differences across conferences in the probability of making the tournament, it is possible that 
restricting the sample to only those conferences known to receive a substantial number of at-
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large bids will reduce any noise generated by including institutions that would be expected from 
historical evidence to have a low probability of receiving an at-large bid simply based on their 
conference.  In this way, these restricted sample analyses serve as a robustness check to the full 
sample models.  Tables 3.8 and 3.9 present the results of the regression discontinuity analysis 
when the sample is restricted to the 17 conferences
17
 with at least one at-large bid between 2001 
and 2012.  With this restriction, Table 3.8 shows that making the tournament has a significant 
effect in the optimal bandwidth (p<0.1) on basketball revenues in the year of the tournament 
appearance.  The magnitude of this effect is approximately $2.9 million, very similar to the 
same-year effect for the full sample in Table 3.6.  In addition, two of the additional bandwidths 
produced significant results for basketball revenues.  Significant results were also found for total 
athletic revenues in Table 3.8, but only for alternative bandwidths.  Table 3.9 shows the 
restricted sample results when the outcome variables measure the types of revenue in the year 
following the tournament appearance.  Here, the only significant effects are found on basketball 
revenues using the alternative bandwidths.  One possible explanation for this is that next-year 
effects may be associated with success in the tournament, not just making the tournament.  In 
other words, next-year effects may only be realized by those that make tournament runs (e.g., 
making the Final Four), and not everyone that makes the tournament. 
While the results, as a whole, provide some evidence of a positive effect of making the 
tournament on basketball and total athletic revenues, there are some concerns about these 
findings.  Most importantly, the standard errors associated with the regression discontinuity 
estimates and the optimal bandwidths over which the effects are estimated are consistently large.  
This is not entirely surprising since fuzzy regression discontinuity designs typically have larger 
                                                          
17
 These conferences are the ACC, Atlantic 10, Big 12, Big East, Big Ten, Big West, Colonial, Conference USA, 
Horizon, Metro Atlantic, Missouri Valley, Mountain West, Pac 10/12, SEC, Sun Belt, WAC, and WCC. 
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bandwidths than sharp regression discontinuity designs.  Also concerning is the sensitivity to 
bandwidth selection of the estimates.  For example, in Table 3.8, a significant, positive effect 
was found using the optimal bandwidth and two of the three alternative bandwidths, but not all 
bandwidths.  At the same time, the magnitudes of effect varied greatly by bandwidth.  Again 
using Table 3.6’s basketball revenues results, the effect size was $2.8 million using the optimal 
bandwidth (8.78), but over $7 million using a bandwidth of three.  All of this may raise concerns 
about the validity of the research design.   
In summary, despite some concerns, the findings support the existence of a positive effect 
of making the NCAA men’s basketball tournament on basketball-specific revenues and total 
athletic revenues.  No evidence of a positive effect of making the tournament on institutional 
revenues was found.  This research provides further insight into the financial effects of 
intercollegiate athletics.  These activities are a highly visible aspect of higher education in the 
United States and they generate and consume increasingly more resources.  As such, it is 
important to understand how athletics revenues are impacted by various events.  As one of the 
largest and most prestigious events in college sports, the impacts of the NCAA men’s basketball 
tournament are of particular interest.  While the financial effects of athletics success have been 
researched in previous work, these studies have largely focused on donations.  This study makes 
a unique contribution by focusing on basketball-specific, total athletic, and institutional revenues.  
Another contribution of this study is its application of a quasi-experimental, regression 
discontinuity design.  Anderson (2012) is the only previous work that I am aware of that utilizes 
quasi-experimental design (propensity score matching) in the field of intercollegiate athletics, 
and I am not aware of any research that applies a quasi-experimental approach to the NCAA 
men’s basketball tournament as this study does. 
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 The results of this study may be of particular interest to intercollegiate athletics 
policymakers, namely the NCAA, directors of athletics, institutional leaders, and perhaps even 
coaches as they negotiate their contracts.  The NCAA may consider the findings from this study 
in determining how to administer the men’s basketball tournament.  For example, perhaps 
knowing the financial implications of making the field will persuade the NCAA to expand or 
contract the field.  The decisions to expand the field from 64 to 65 in 2001 and then from 65 to 
68 in 2011 have presumably been made without the type of meaningful information that this 
study provides.  Directors of athletics and institutional leaders may find this research useful in 
budget setting.  Knowing the effects of tournament appearances may allow directors of athletics 
to adjust their budgets accordingly and institutional leaders may choose to adjust institutional 
contributions to athletics.  
 Limitations and Future Research 
While the findings may provide useful insights and the design itself makes a unique 
contribution to the intercollegiate athletics literature, there are some limitations to this study.  
One limitation is simply the data.  While the EADA data includes sport-specific data to fulfill its 
purpose of tracking equity in athletics, athletic departments do not necessarily assign all revenues 
by sport.  More traditional financial data may include revenues by source (e.g., ticket sales, 
donations, etc.), like the USA Today Athletics Finance data used in Essay 2.  As a result of the 
unique nature of the EADA data and the fact that it is unaudited, there may be definitional issues 
and other data quality issues.  Another limitation may be the composite assignment score itself, 
which is defensible, yet still somewhat subjective.  While it was built with the available data and 
an understanding of what likely contribute to tournament selection, it is certainly not as clean as 
other applications of regression discontinuity designs where there is a single contributor to 
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assignment score and known cutoff value.  This study also does not consider the effects of 
tournament performance on the outcome variables and only considers at-large bids, which is 
necessary given the different selection criteria, yet leaves unanswered questions about the effects 
of receiving an automatic bid or performance (winning) during the tournament. 
 Despite these potential limitations and concerns, this study will hopefully inform future 
research in the area.  The use of the NCAA basketball tournament in a quasi-experimental 
framework could be expanded to study its effects on other outcomes, even those that have been 
studied previously through different methods, like donations, applications, and student outcomes.  
Similarly, while the first two research questions in this study address athletic revenues, a possible 
extension of this research may be to look at the effect of making the NCAA tournament on 
athletic expenditures.  Comparing the effects on revenues and expenditures may allow for 
discussion of net effects.   
 Another extension of this study may be to consider additional time periods.  Whereas this 
study considered carryover effects in the year following a tournament appearance, additional 
timeframes could be included as an extension to this study.  A related extension may be to 
consider the impact of actual tournament performance on the difference revenue streams.  In may 
be the case that runs deep into the tournament (e.g., Final Four appearances) may have effects on 
revenues that last for several years. 
Finally, while the third research question only addresses total institutional revenue, a 
possible extension of this research may be to analyze specific institutional revenue streams, like 
tuition or state appropriations.  State appropriations may be especially interesting given that 
Humphreys (2006) found a relationship between football participation and appropriations.  Of 
course, an analysis of state appropriations would limit the data to only public institutions.  
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Another possible extension of this research would be to analyze to the effects of making the 
NCAA tournament on academic measures, like average test scores for applicants or entering 
students.  Several studies have considered the effects of athletics on academic measures (e.g., 
Anderson, 2012; Bremmer & Kesselring, 1993; McCormick & Tinsley, 1987; Mixon, 1995; 
Toma & Cross, 1998; Tucker & Amato, 2003; Tucker, 2005), but using the proposed regression 
discontinuity design to analyze the effects of making the men’s NCAA basketball tournament 
would make a unique contribution to this literature by exploring causal relationships.  With 
changes in the intercollegiate athletics landscape, including conference realignments and 
tournament changes, revisiting this study in future years may also yield interesting insights into 
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Table 3.1: Model variables, descriptions, and data sources 
Variable 
Name Variable Long Name Variable Description 
Source 
Code 
bball_rev Basketball Revenue Revenues allocated to basketball activities. 1 
ath_rev Total Athletic Revenue 
Total athletic department revenues, including those 
allocated to a specific sport and unallocated revenues. 
1 
inst_rev Institutional Revenue Total institutional revenue. 2 
w_reg 
Regular Season Basketball 
Wins 
The number of basketball wins during the regular season. 3 
w_conf Conference Tournament Wins 
The number of wins during the postseason conference 
tournament. 
3 
sos Strength of Schedule Strength of schedule for the basketball season. 3 
CPI Consumer Price Index 






Code Variable Source URL 
1 




Integrated Postsecondary Education 
Data System (IPEDS) 
http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/  
3 Sports Reference http://www.sports-reference.com/cbb/  
4 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics 
VARIABLES Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Basketball rev. (CPI-adj)           3,515  $3,025,320  $3,868,434  $25,400  $41,700,000  
Total athleic rev. (CPI-adj)           3,515  $22,800,000  $23,300,000  $165,841  $163,000,000  
Institutional rev. (CPI-adj)           3,480  $673,000,000  $944,000,000  $2,724,147  $11,300,000,000  
Regular season wins           3,515  14.34 5.13 0.00 30.00 
Conference tournament wins           3,515                   0.59  0.74 0.00 3.00 
Strength of Schedule (SOS)           3,515  -0.30 5.55 -15.81 12.70 
Assignment variable           3,515                 12.67                    .97  -9.41                   33.97  
      
Number of institutions 345     
Obs. per Institution: Min 1     
Obs. per Institution: Avg 10.19     
Obs. per Institution: Max 12         
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Table 3.3: Regression analysis of discontinuity at cut score 
VARIABLES probability 










* Cut Score Dummy -0.00808*** 
 (0.000244) 









Number of unitid 345 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Note: X represents observed covariates and U represents unobserved covariates.
Assignment Variable:  





1. Basketball Revenue 
2. Athletics Revenue 
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Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics above and below cut score 
VARIABLES Below Assignment Above Assignment 
 [20.25, 21.25) [21.25, 22.25) 
 n = 90 n = 100 
  Mean Mean 
Number of Sponsored Sports                       16.62                        16.68  
                      (4.28)                      (3.57) 
Number of Athletes                          528                           527  
                       (186)                       (189) 
Enrollment                     20,207                      19,893  
                  (11,409)                  (11,354) 
Tuition  $                 11,332   $                 12,529  
                   (10,652)                  (10,621) 
Standard deviations in parentheses 
bin size = 1   
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Table 3.5: Results from the McCrary density test 
VARIABLES   
Estimator (log difference in height) 0.20980 
 (0.13208) 
  
bin size 0.23522 
bandwidth 5.86504 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 3.6: Regression discontinuity results, same-year effects of making the tournament 
      Additional Bandwidths 
  Optimal Bandwidth
1
 3 6 9 
Basketball Revenues 8.78  2,777,462**  7,224,925** 4,443,191** 2,699,676** 
  
(1,305,152) (2,988,164) (1,777,450) (1,279,418) 
Total Athletic Revenues 8.97 1.48e+07* 3.58e+07** 2.00e+07* 1.48e+07* 
  
(7,652,446) (1.62e+07) (1.06e+07) (7,632,257) 
Institutional Revenues
2
 6.92 -1.71e+08 -7.47e+08 2.41e+08 -9.63e+07 
    (3.74e+08) (8.46e+08) (4.31e+08) (2.85e+08) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  1
 Optimal bandwidth based on Imbens & Kalyanaraman (2009). 
2
 Because of missing values, the estimating sample for the analyses of institutional revenues is not the same as the other analyses 
   (n = 3,480 rather than 3,515). 
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Table 3.7: Regression discontinuity results, next-year effects of making the tournament 
      Additional Bandwidths 
  Optimal Bandwidth
1
 3 6 9 
Basketball Revenues 8.96  2,700,387*  7,720,548** 4,270,765* 2,691,180* 
  
(1,538,804) (3,918,266) (2,235,682) (1,533,060) 
Total Athletic Revenues 9.38 9,122,719  1.16e+07 7,654,425  8,814,815  
  
(8,053,035) (2.16e+07) (1.27e+07) (8,386,959) 
Institutional Revenues
2
 7.96 4,453,427 -5.79e+08 -1.14e+08 4.27e+07 
    (3.28e+08) (8.69e+08) (4.41e+08) (2.90e+08) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  1
 Optimal bandwidth based on Imbens & Kalyanaraman (2009). 
2
 Because of missing values, the estimating sample for the analyses of institutional revenues is not the same as the other analyses 
   (n = 3,480 rather than 3,515). 
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Table 3.8: Regression discontinuity results, same-year effects with restricted sample 
      Additional Bandwidths 
  Optimal Bandwidth
1
 3 6 9 
Basketball Revenues 7.60  2,885,120*  6,852,443** 3,964,546** 2,074,908 
  
(1,470,530) (3,197,282) (1,772,353) (1,273,924) 
Total Athletic Revenues 9.36 1.17e+07 3.55e+07** 1.82e+07* 1.20e+07 
  
(7,510,574) (1.73e+07) (1.07e+07) (7,745,396) 
Institutional Revenues
2
 9.73 -1.46e+08 -4.56+08 -2.30+08 -1.70e+08 
    (2.60e+08) (7.34+08) (4.08e+08) (2.79e+08) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  1
 Optimal bandwidth based on Imbens & Kalyanaraman (2009). 
2
 Because of missing values, the estimating sample for the analyses of institutional revenues is not the same as the other analyses 
   (n = 3,480 rather than 3,515). 
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Table 3.9: Regression discontinuity results, next-year effects with restricted sample 
      Additional Bandwidths 
  Optimal Bandwidth
1
 3 6 9 
Basketball Revenues 9.97 1,854,218 7,409,692* 3,812,564* 2,037,955 
  
(1,406,194) (4,065,780) (2,208,107) (1,532,557) 
Total Athletic Revenues 8.17 4,734,021 7,510,116 4,207,400 4,894,909 
  
(9,425,086) (2.22e+07) (1.26e+07) (8,577,841) 
Institutional Revenues
2
 7.66 -1.09e+08 -7.39e+08 -2.28e+08 -6.02e+07 
    (3.52e+08) (9.07e+08) (4.47e+08) (2.99e+08) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  1
 Optimal bandwidth based on Imbens & Kalyanaraman (2009). 
2
 Because of missing values, the estimating sample for the analyses of institutional revenues is not the same as the other analyses 
   (n = 3,480 rather than 3,515). 
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APPENDIX B 




















        1.0000  
   Basketball SOS
†
        0.2064         1.0000  
  Football PPG
*
        0.0473         0.1683         1.0000  
 Football SOS
†
        0.2609         0.8068         0.1442         1.0000  
*
 PPG = points per game. 
   † SOS = strength of schedule. 
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Table B2: First-stage Results, Basketball Wins Instrumented on SOS and PPG  
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Full Model BCS-Only Non-BCS 
VARIABLES Basketball Wins Basketball Wins Basketball Wins 
        
Enrollment 1.89e-05 0.000142 -1.57e-05 
 
(0.000108) (0.000162) (0.000162) 
Sport count -0.0770 -0.194 -0.0578 
 
(0.120) (0.291) (0.132) 
Institutional rev. (CPI-adj) 1.70e-10 7.36e-10 -4.06e-09 
 
(8.51e-10) (1.00e-09) (2.52e-09) 
Ticket sales (CPI-adj.) -7.64e-09 4.15e-08 1.77e-07 
 
(7.81e-08) (1.01e-07) (3.31e-07) 
Basketbal PPG
*
 0.639*** 0.684*** 0.615*** 
 
(0.0263) (0.0533) (0.0305) 
Basketball SOS
†
 -0.0505 0.196 -0.0988 
 
(0.0716) (0.157) (0.0821) 
    Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES 
    Observations 1,490 370 1,117 
Number of institutions 225 54 171 
R-squared 0.333 0.369 0.327 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
*
 PPG = points per game. 
   † SOS = strength of schedule. 
  Note: The first-stage results in Table B2 correspond to Table 2.8.
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Table B3: First-stage Results, Football Wins Instrumented on SOS and PPG  
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Full Model FBS FCS 
VARIABLES 
Football winning 
pct (*100) Football wins Football wins 
        
Enrollment -0.000399 -3.12e-05 -0.000219 
 
(0.000383) (5.60e-05) (0.000144) 
Sport count -0.272 0.0278 0.00218 
 
(0.446) (0.0978) (0.0779) 
Institutional rev. (CPI-adj) -3.17e-10 1.01e-10 1.30e-09 
 
(2.84e-09) (3.87e-10) (2.23e-09) 
Ticket sales (CPI-adj.) -1.30e-07 1.00e-08 9.04e-07** 
 
(2.63e-07) (3.65e-08) (4.02e-07) 
Football PPG
*
 1.933*** 0.263*** 0.229*** 
 
(0.0735) (0.0127) (0.0159) 
Football SOS
†
 -0.245* -0.0430 -0.00582 
 
(0.125) (0.0281) (0.0231) 
    Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES 
    Observations 1,177 677 499 
Number of institutions 174 98 77 
R-squared 0.423 0.452 0.362 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
*
 PPG = points per game. 
   † SOS = strength of schedule. 
  Note: The first-stage results in Table B3 correspond to Table 2.10.
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Table B4: First-stage Results, Basketball and Football Wins Instrumented on SOS and PPG  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 












            
Enrollment -0.000161 -0.000141 -0.000231 0.000186 -0.000423 
 
(0.000252) (0.000251) (0.000766) (0.000296) (0.000453) 
Sport count -0.342 0.150 -0.569 -0.161 -0.394 
 
(0.292) (0.439) (0.414) (0.532) (0.354) 
Institutional rev. (CPI-adj) -6.41e-10 -2.05e-10 8.47e-10 1.13e-09 -9.87e-09 
 
(1.86e-09) (1.73e-09) (1.18e-08) (1.83e-09) (6.28e-09) 
Ticket sales (CPI-adj.) -1.97e-08 -3.95e-09 1.68e-06 1.22e-07 8.52e-07 
 
(1.72e-07) (1.64e-07) (2.14e-06) (1.85e-07) (8.02e-07) 
Basketball PPG
*
 1.292*** 1.377*** 1.178*** 1.279*** 1.290*** 
 
(0.0639) (0.0782) (0.107) (0.0977) (0.0829) 
Basketball SOS
†
 -0.438** -0.156 -0.775** 0.0773 -0.635*** 
 
(0.176) (0.205) (0.320) (0.288) (0.227) 
Football PPG
*
 0.586*** 0.545*** 0.649*** 0.482*** 0.644*** 
 
(0.0481) (0.0568) (0.0846) (0.0768) (0.0623) 
Football SOS
†
 -0.0764 -0.424*** 0.0999 -0.414** 0.00246 
 
(0.0822) (0.126) (0.123) (0.176) (0.0980) 
      Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
      Observations 1177 677 499 370 804 
Number of institutions 174 98 77 54 120 
R-squared 0.363 0.433 0.313 0.412 0.358 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
*
 PPG = points per game. 
     
†
 SOS = strength of schedule. 
    Note: The first-stage results in Table B4 correspond to Table 2.12.
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APPENDIX C 
Table C1: First-stage Results, Regression Discontinuity Analysis  
  (1) (2) 
 
Full Sample Restricted Sample 
VARIABLES Probability Probability 
   Assignment score (centered at cut score) 0.00706*** 0.0111*** 
 
(0.000226) (0.000399) 
Indicator for assignment greater than cut 
score 0.663*** 0.627*** 
 
(0.00471) (0.00654) 
   Observations 3,515 1,985 
Number of institutions 345 190 
R-squared 0.929 0.935 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 
